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A firm's dividend policy reflects management's decision as to what portion
of accumulated earnings will be distributed to shareholders and what portion
will be retained for reinvestment.' A firm's retained earnings represent the
amount of financing that the firm can utilize without having to compete against
other firms in the capital markets. Because dividend policy wholly determines
the amount of earnings that a firm retains, dividend policy also determines the
extent to which a firm can escape the scrutiny of participants in the capital
markets.
Retained earnings are the greatest source of capital for firms. The typical
U.S. industrial corporation finances almost seventy-five percent of its capital
expenditures from retained earnings, whereas new equity issues provide a
negligible fraction of corporate funding.2 Scholars have long recognized firms'
significant dependence on retained earnings and negligible dependence on
equity financing. This phenomenon led Professor Baumol to the inescapable
conclusion that a substantial proportion of firms "manage to avoid the direct
disciplining influences of the securities market, or at least to evade the type of
discipline which can be imposed by the provision of funds to inefficient firms
only on extremely unfavorable terms."4 Unfortunately for the sake of
allocative efficiency, in recent years, most firms have also managed to avoid
even the indirect disciplining influences of the market for corporate control.
Inefficient managers might try to escape a market inspection of their
performance by adopting a low-payout dividend policy and avoiding the
1. The result of this decision is referred to as the firm's dividend payout ratio: the ratio between
earnings distributed as dividends and total earnings (dividends / total earnings = payout ratio).
2. From 1981 to 1991, U.S. corporations financed 74.7% of their new investments from internally
generated cash flow. The figure of 74.7% represents net income plus depreciation minus dividends,
Between 1981 and 1991, average new equity financing was about -I 1%, as firms repurchased more shares
than they issued. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 406 tbl. 14.1 (3d ed. 1993),
Moreover, on average, publicly traded firms issue "seasoned" equity-additional equity issued by a firm
whose shares are already traded in public markets-only once every 18.5 years. See Lynn A. Stout. The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation,
87 MICH. L. REv. 613, 647 n.186 (1988). The portion of corporate funding that does not come from either
retained earnings or equity is raised through debt financing. See id. at 648.
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAuMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 69 (1965);
GORDON DONALDSON, CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY 56 (1961).
The proclivity of U.S. firms to finance their capital expenditures from internally generated cash flows
is almost without parallel in the world of international corporate finance. Compared to U.S. corporations,
firms in other countries finance much less of their capital expenditures from internal cash flow and much
more of their capital expenditures from new equity issues. Germany is the only major industrial country
whose firms generate as much financing internally as do U.S. firms. See ROSS ET AL., supra note 2, at
408-09.
4. BAUMOL, supra note 3, at 70. For this reason, Baumol noted that "[olne might almost venture to
conclude... that the market in fact does not allocate much of the economy's capital." Id. at 79. Market
pricing of new stock issues directly influences the allocative efficiency of the economy by determining
firms' cost of capital. The fact that the market allocates so little capital, however, has provided grounds for
doubting the importance of capital markets efficiency. See Stout, supra note 2. at 617-18.
5. See Stout, supra note 2, at 691 (contending that managerial defensive tactics and state antitakeover
legislation have raised costs of hostile takeover significantly above that which would be incurred in free
market for corporate control).
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competitive external market for financing.6 Seemingly oblivious to this threat
of managerial opportunism, state courts have established that directors possess
sole discretion over whether or not to declare dividends, and that, absent abuse
of discretion, the law will not second-guess the business judgment of corporate
officers.7  The general rule is that only fraud, bad faith, or gross
mismanagement can justify compelling distribution! This rule removes any
effective limit on managerial decisions concerning the timing and quantity of
dividend distributions.
In granting management the protection of the business judgment rule,
courts have placed a heavy burden on shareholders who wish to challenge
management's dividend policy. A shareholder suit to compel dividend
distribution, based on the claim that management is investing in bad (negative
net present value) projects, has virtually no chance of succeeding. In fact, in
the last one hundred years, there has not been a single case in which U.S.
courts have ordered a management-controlled, publicly traded corporation to
increase the dividend on its common stock.9
Although a few scholars have recognized the need to restrain managerial
discretion over dividend policy,'0 a thorough analysis of the dividend policy
6. The risk of managerial abuse of discretion is known as agency cost See Michael C Jcnsen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior. Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). Indeed, as some of the hterature on takcovcrs suggests, many
managers do abuse their discretion and retain excessive earnings See. e.g.. Michael C Jensen. Agency
Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. 76 AM ECON REV 323 (1986) [hereinafter
Jensen, Agency Costs].
7. State corporate law does preclude managers from paying excessive dividends to shareholders
"Historically, the principal objective of dividend law has therefore been the preservation of a minimum of
assets as a safeguard in assuring the payment of creditors' claims - D. KFait. CORPORATE DIVIDENDS
14-15 (1941). What has been true historically remains true today One of the leading corporate law
casebooks devotes almost 90% of its section on dividends to a discussion of the upper legal limits on
management's distributions. See WILIAM L CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG. CORPORATIONS. CASES
AND MATERIALS 1294-1375 (6th ed. 1988).
8. See, e.g., Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 185 A.2d 480, 482-83 (Dcl 1962). Kamm American
Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811-12 (Sup. CIL), aff'd. 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App Dt. 1976). VIcroR
BRUDNEY & MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 502 (3d ed 1987). HARRY G IIEs.% & JOHN
R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 913-14 (3d ed. 1983), David M Israel. Note. The Business
Judgment Rule and the Declaration of Corporate Divtdends A Reappraisal. 4 HOFSTRA L REV 73. 74
(1975).
9. See MERRIT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAtIC Ecooty 375
(1987). Courts have treated closely held corporations much like partnerships. Thus. suits for compelling
dividends in closely held corporations have been more successful For a famous example, see Dodge v
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
10. See, e.g., BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 8. at 517 (asserting that if management
systematically prefers retaining earnings to paying out dividends, then disputes with shareholders o5cr
dividend policy might reflect conflict of interest rather than diffenng business judgments and legal norm
should involve fiduciary duty of loyalty to shareholders); Victor A Brudney. Dividends. Discretion. and
Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REV. 85 (1980) ('The inability to impose feasible limits on management's discretion
in making the dividend decision underscores the significance of defining the extent of management's
obligation to convey the information content of the dividend decision."); Israel. supra note 8. at 98 ("A
better solution to unwarranted retention would be to delimit the parameters of the business judgment rule
as it applies to the declaration of corporate dividends, thereby minimizing management's potential for abuse
of its powers.").
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issue has not appeared in either the law review or finance literature."
Moreover, to date, proposals to reform dividend law have been ineffective. 2
In general, the body of legal literature on dividend policy is sparse; this Article
provides a much-needed analysis of how the law ought to regulate managerial
decisions- regarding dividend policy.
This Article proposes a legal norm that shifts discretion over dividend
policy from managers to the capital markets (i.e., shareholders). 13 State
corporate law could effect such a shift by adopting a rule that mandates
shareholder control over the dividend decision. The rule would require every
firm to adopt an option mechanism that, at predetermined dates, provided each
of the firm's shareholders with the right to select either cash or stock dividends
in an amount equal to the shareholder's pro rata share of the firm's earnings.
For instance, the law might require that, once a year, the firm offer to each
shareholder the right to decide what percentage of her share of earnings she
will take out of the firm-through a cash dividend-and what percentage she
will leave in the firm-through a stock dividend. The option mechanism would
be a cost-effective vehicle for assigning control over a firm's accumulated
earnings to the capital markets.
Theory and evidence suggest that an unfettered management retains an
excessive amount of earnings.' 4 Entrusting the capital markets with control
over the earnings reinvestment decision would facilitate optimal earnings
retention by firms' 5 and lessen the need for the indirect and expensive
discipline provided by the market for corporate control.' 6 Moreover, by giving
I1. This dearth of analysis is mainly due to the immaturity of finance theory when scholars wrote the
leading legal articles on dividend policy. See Brudney, supra note 10 (advocating mandatory disclosure of
reasons underlying dividend decisions); see also Daniel R. Fischel, The Law and Economics of Dividend
Policy, 67 VA. L. REV. 699 (1981) (criticizing Brudney and arguing in favor of current law). These articles
show a sophisticated use of finance theory, but they appeared before the development of the compelling
agency-cost explanation of dividend policy. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of
Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 650 (1984) (arguing that main function of dividends is to align managerial
incentives with incentives of shareholders); Michael S. Rozeff, Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as
Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios, 5 J. FIN. RES. 249 (1982) (suggesting that high dividend payout
policies raise transaction costs of external financing but lower agency costs of management). A more recent
article simply neglects to analyze the agency-cost explanation. See Richard A. Booth, Junk Bonds, the
Relevance of Dividends and the Limits of Managerial Discretion, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. Rev. 553.
12. See infra part IIn.B.
13. In all aspects relevant to this Article, the capital markets operate through the actions of particular
shareholders. The capital markets generally function through shareholders' pricing of shares (through
purchase and sale of shares) and shareholders' exercise of voting rights.
14. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
15. Shifting discretion over dividend policy to shareholders would allow them to force distribution of
dividends every time they believed the internal profitability of the firm to be insufficient.
16. The market for corporate control, or the takeover market, is an external mechanism for controlling
agency costs in publicly held corporations. Outsiders can oust ineffective managers by making direct
appeals to a firm's residual claimants:
The market for corporate control requires and presumes a high positive correlation
between corporate managerial efficiency and stock price. The stock price of a poorly managed
company declines relative to its industry or the market as a whole. A lower stock price
facilitates takeover by giving the prospect of a large capital gain to those who believe that they
can manage the company more efficiently. Thus, the takeover market provides some assurance
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the capital markets some control over the allocation of approximately seventy-
five percent of corporate expenditures, shareholder dividend options would
enhance the importance of capital markets in achieving allocative efficiency. 7
Part I of this Article analyzes the role of dividend policy in reducing
agency costs. It begins by presenting the "dividend puzzle" and questioning
why distribution of dividends affects a firm's value, given the theoretical
irrelevance of dividend policy. This Part then rehearses the agency-cost
explanation for the existence of dividends. Next, it compares the current
practice of firms-maintaining a stable dividend distribution-with alternative
mechanisms for controlling agency costs. Finally, it argues for the superiority
of shareholder dividend options.
Part II explores why firms do not voluntarily adopt the option mechanism
in spite of its superiority to current practice. The most likely explanation is the
tax distortion in the Internal Revenue Code that would require current taxation
of shareholders receiving a dividend option. Indeed, to the extent that firms are
willing to sustain tax costs, they do adopt an option mechanism to enhance
efficiency: dividend reinvestment plans. The remainder of the Part considers
means of removing the tax distortion.
Part mJ considers the justification for and workability of a corporate law
rule mandating the option mechanism. It argues that a mandatory rule is
justified by the need to improve the performance of inefficient firms by
exposing them to the scrutiny of the capital markets. It also demonstrates the
feasibility of mandating the option mechanism and discusses the role of the
courts in implementing dividend options. Part IV summarizes the preceding
arguments and concludes that shifting control over dividend policy to
shareholders is desirable and should be implemented, albeit gradually.
I. THE USE OF DIVIDEND POLICY To REDUCE AGENCY COSTS
A. The Dividend Puzzle
The logical starting point for any discussion about dividends is the
"Irrelevance Theorem" of Modigliani and Miller.' According to this theorem,
if a firm's investment policy is predetermined and immutable, dividend policy
cannot affect the firm's value. If a firm does not distribute dividends, the price
of its equity will rise proportionally with earnings, and investors can obtain a
of competitive efficiency among corporate managers ...
J. FRED WFSON ET AL., MERGERS, RESTRUCTURING. AND CORPORATE CONTROL 45 (1990) Ihereinafter
MERGERS AND RESTRUCTURING]. For an introduction to the economics of the market for corporate control.
authored by the "inventor" of the concept, see Henry G. Manne. Mergers and tht Market for Corporate
Control. 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
17. See Stout, supra note 2, at 648.
18. Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani. Dividend Polic.y. Growth. and the Valuation of Shares,
34 J. Bus. 411 (1961).
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"homemade dividend" by selling a fraction of their shares on the market and
liquidating their capital gains. On the other hand, if a firm does distribute
dividends, and hence finances new investment by raising funds in the capital
markets, the price of its equity will decline in proportion to the dividend
payout. The capital markets, therefore, should be indifferent as to whether or
not a firm distributes dividends, because in either case the investor possesses
the same amount of wealth. Nevertheless, given the high costs of raising new
funds in the capital markets and the inferior tax treatment of cash dividends
compared to capital gains, 9 distributing dividends will generally reduce the
value of the firm. Consequently, no prudent management should pay out
dividends. In practice, however, managers do not behave as if they subscribe
to the irrelevance theorem. Firms do distribute dividends, and management's
promise to increase the dividend payout ratio usually leads to increases in the
price of the firm's equity. Actual practice suggests that investors and managers
do care about dividend policy. This conflict between theory and practice is
known as the "dividend puzzle.
20
The literature on dividend policy revolves around this puzzle. Why do
managers distribute dividends at all? Why do investors care about dividends?
Scholars have offered various explanations. First, dividends might have
information or signaling effects: Managers might change their firm's dividend
payout ratio to signal their forecast of the firm's future performance.2
Second, tax rates drive investors to hold stock in firms with particular payout
ratios: Other things being equal, low tax bracket investors hold stock in firms
that pay high dividends, and high tax bracket investors hold stock in firms that
pay low dividends.22 Third, dividends can increase a firm's efficiency by
reducing agency costs: Distribution of dividends diminishes the internal cash
flow subject to management's discretion.23 The agency-cost resolution of the
dividend puzzle is the most compelling of the proferred explanations24 and
will be the focus of the next Section.
19. Even when cash dividends and capital gains were taxed at the same rates (e.g., under the Tax
Reform Act of 1986), the Intemal Revenue Code still favored capital gains over dividends. The ability to
postpone the realization of capital gains (i.e., to defer the sale of the stock) is of considerable value. See
Steven V. Mann, The Dividend Puzzle: A Progress Report, 28 Q.J. Bus. & ECON. 3 (1989).
20. Fischer Black, The Dividend Puzzle, J. PORTFOLIO MOMT., winter 1976, at 5.
21. See Paul Asquith & David NV. Mullins, Jr., Signalling with Dividends, Stock Repurchases, and
Equity Issues, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1986, at 27, 35.
22. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on
Common Stock Prices and Returns, 1 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 2-3 (1974); Merton H. Miller & Myron S. Scholes,
Dividends and Taxes, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 333, 334 (1978).
23. See Easterbrook, supra note I1, at 652-53 (noting possibility of "substantial divergence between
[managers'] interests and those of the other participants" in firm).
24. See id.; Rozeff, supra note 11.
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B. Agency-Cost Theor. and Stable Dividends
An agency relationship is a consensual relationship in which one
person-the principal-employs another person-the agent-to act on the
principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control. Given that both
parties in the relationship will seek to maximize their own utility, it is
reasonable to expect that conflicts of interest will emerge and that the agent
will not always act in accord with the wishes of the principal. The principal
can limit this divergence of interests by providing appropriate incentives for
the agent and by incurring monitoring costs, i.e., supervising the behavior of
the agent. Additionally, the agent can limit the divergence of interests by
incurring bonding costs, i.e., promising not to take certain actions against the
interest of the principal or promising to compensate the principal if he does
take such actions. 26 Removing the conflict of interest entirely, however, is
impossible: A residual loss of welfare will always remain, even after the
principal incurs monitoring costs and the agent incurs bonding costs. The
"agency costs" of the separation of ownership and control are the costs
incurred by principal and agent to minimize the agent's aberrant behavior and
the welfare lost despite the precautions taken.'
A conflict-ridden agency relationship exists between outside shareholders
(as principal) and management (as agent) in a public corporation.2' Managers
have an incentive to behave in an opportunistic manner: retaining excessive
earnings and investing undistributed funds ("free cash flow," in corporate law
parlance) suboptimally. 29 Managers have several motives for increasing the
free cash flow of their firm. First, cash reserves increase their autonomy vis-a'-
vis the capital markets. By not raising funds externally, managers avoid a
capital markets inspection of their past performance and the need to persuade
the capital markets of the soundness of their proposed projects." Second,
retention of earnings increases the size of a corporation, thereby increasing
management's compensation, prestige, and political power. A larger
corporation also facilitates managerial consumption of excessive perquisites
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958)
26. It will often be in the agent's interest to incur bonding costs. An agent will be able to command
a higher wage for her service', if she can credibly commit to conform her behaior to the Interests of the
principal.
27. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6. at 308
28. The intensity of the conflict depends on the ownership structure The less equity in the hands of
managers and the more equity in the hands of outside shareholder, the greater the conflict
29. See Jensen. Agency Costs, supra note 6. at 323, Michael C Jensen. The Takeov(er Controerss
Analysis and Evidence. in KNIGHTS. RAIDERS AND TARGETS TiHE IMPACTOI TIlE HOSTtt. TAKEoVer 314.
321 (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1988) Ihereinafter Jensen. Taktoiersl ("Free cash flow, i% cash flow in
excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values shen discounted at the
relevant cost of capital. Such free cash flow must be paid out to shareholders if the firm is to be efficient
and to maximize value for shareholders."): see also 0. WILIJAM.SON. TiE EcOOMIcs ot- DiscREt'OARN
BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF TIlE FIRM 28-37 (1964)
30. See sources cited supra note 3.
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and enables management to reward middle managers with promotions. 31
Third, accumulated earnings decrease the risk of bankruptcy, either by
increasing the firm's equity or by facilitating the firm's acquisition of other
enterprises in order to diversify away the risk of business failure. 2
Unfortunately, projects financed by retained earnings have a lower return than
projects financed by new issuances of debt or equity. 3 The managerial
preference for internal financing disregards the shareholder preference for a
higher external rate of return.
The problem of free cash flow is not hypothetical?34 Nor are the costs of
free cash flow negligible. Investors are aware of management's pernicious
tendency to retain excessive amounts of earnings; investors rationally discount
31. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61,
66 Ihereinafter Jensen, Eclipse].
32. Managers' human capital is an investment in the firm that is exposed to the risk of bankruptcy.
Managers can only diversify that risk through acquisitions of different firms. Managers' acquisitions for
the purpose of diversification are usually suboptimal, because shareholders can diversify their risk more
efficiently and do not need managers to diversify through expensive acquisitions. See Yakov Amihud &
Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECoN. 605
(1981).
33. See infra note 35.
34. See, e.g., Brent W. Ambrose & Drew B. Winters, Does an Industry Effect Exist for Leveraged
Buyouts?, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1992, at 89; Margaret M. Blair & Martha A. Schary, Industry-Level
Indicators of Free Cash Flow, in THE DEAL DECADE 99, 128 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993) (concluding
from empirical data that "from 1982 through 1989 the U.S. corporate sector was caught up in an epidemic
of free cash flow"); Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going
Private Transactions, 44 J. FIN. 771 (1989).
The conflict of interests between managers and shareholders over free cash flow is the most
significant of the agency costs that large public corporations face. See HENRY HANSMANN, OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 32-34, on file with author); Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 31,
at 66.
35. A study by Baumol, Haim, Malkiel, and Quandt (BHMQ) determined that the return on retained
earnings ranged from 3.0% to 4.6%, on debt from 4.2% to 14.0%, and on newly issued equity from 14.5%
to 20.8%. The range of returns exists because of various definitions of earnings and diverse assumptions
about the lag between the time of investment and realization of returns. See William J. Baumol ct al.,
Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 345, 347-48, 353
(1970).
These results were the subject of several methodological criticisms. See R.A. Brealey et al., The
Return on Alternative Sources of Finance, 58 REv. ECON. & STAT. 469 (1976); Irwin Friend & Frank
Husic, Efficiency of Corporate Investment, 55 REV. ECON. & STAT. 122 (1973); George A. Racette,
Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm: A Comment, 55 REV. EON. & STAT. 127
(1973); G. Whittington, The Profitability of Retained Earnings, 54 REV. ECON. & STAT. 152 (1972).
In response to these criticisms, BHMQ performed a second study that divided the original sample of
firms into two groups. The second study found that for firms issuing more than trivial amounts of new
equity, the return on retained earnings (11.2%) was in the same range as the return on equity (12.3%) and
on debt (9.8%). For firms that issued insignificant amounts of new equity, however, the average rate of
return on retained earnings was about zero. See William J. Baumol et al., Efficiency of Corporate
Investment: Reply, 55 REV. ECON. & STAT. 128 (1973). But cf. Ramaswami Murali & Johnathan B. Welch,
Agents. Owners, Control and Performance, 16 J. BUS. FIN. & ACcT. 385, 396 (1989) (finding no evidence
of differential performance between closely held and widely held firms due to differences in agency costs).
Also, studies have shown that managers tend to invest retained earnings in ventures that yield lower
returns and face lower risk than those financed by new capital. The lower yield is probably due to
managers' large investment in firm-specific assets. Managers' investment of human capital is less
diversified than passive investor portfolios. See Edward S. Mason, The Apologetics of "Managerialism",
31 J. Bus. I (1958); R. Joseph Monsen, Jr. & Anthony Downs, A Theory of Large Managerial Firms, 73
J. POL. ECON. 221, 232-33 (1965).
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a firm's stock price to reflect the expected costs of this form of managerial
opportunism. Management thereby acquires an incentive to promise investors
credibly that managerial discretion over dividend policy will not be abused.3
Dividends can serve as a solution to the problem of agency costs. For
instance, managers can pledge to distribute a substantial amount of dividends
annually. The distributions themselves decrease funds available for suboptimal
managerial investment and perquisite consumption.17 Moreover, a dividend
distribution compels a firm to raise new funds in order to execute its business
plans. This need for financing will expose the firm to the scrutiny of investors
in the capital markets and of investment bankers and underwriters who serve
as intermediaries between the firm and the capital markets. The scrutiny of
participants in the capital markets will further reduce the firm's potential to
make poor investments. 38 In short, dividend distribution reduces agency costs.
The proposition that dividends are able to ameliorate the agency-cost
problem enjoys significant empirical support. One scholar has determined that
"[flirms establish higher dividend payouts when insiders hold a lower fraction
of the equity and/or a greater number of stockholders own the outside equity.
This evidence supports the view that dividend payments are part of the firm's




A host of other studies have corroborated this result.0 Notwithstanding the
empirical verification, the agency-cost explanation of the dividend puzzle has
a major shortcoming. Dividend payouts per se do not effectively bond
management to reduce agency costs. Since dividend policy is completely
within the discretion of management, managers can opportunistically reduce
or omit dividend payouts at any time.
36. There are several means by which the corporate structure controls managenal opponunism the
incentives embodied in managerial compensation. the monitorng function performed by the board of
directors, and the shareholder voting mechanism. In addition, there are forces outside the corporate structure
that restrain management: the product markets, the financial markets (equity or debt). the market for
managerial services, and the market for corporate control. Several of these means of control operate in
concert; others operate in sequence, coming into play only as the level of inefficiency increases
37. The actual dividend payout would reflect a balance between the benefits of reducing agency costs
and the costs of paying dividends. The latter include the personal tax liability imposed on shareholders and
the transaction costs involved in raising new funds in the market to finance investments The existence of
debt in the capital structure increases the costs of dividend distribution Because di'vidend distrbution
increases bondholders' risk of default, bondholders will charge higher interest rates and thereby increase
the cost of the firm's debt. Given that each firm has a different ownership structure, and thus a different
susceptibility to agency costs, each firm's optimal dividend policy is idios),ncratic See JAMES S ANG. Do
DIvIDENDS MATrER? A REVIEW OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND TI4EORIES AND EVIDIE.NCE 10 (Monograph Series
in Fin. & Econ. No. 2. 1987).
38. See Easterbrook, supra note II. at 654.
39. Rozeff, supra note 1. at 250.
40. See Claire E. Crutchley & Robert S. Hansen. A Test of the Agency Theor" of Managerial
Ownership. Corporate Leverage. and Corporate Dividends. FIN. MGMT._ winter 1989. at 36. 37. John S
Jahera, Jr. et al., Growth, Beta. and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend. AKRON BUS & ECON
REv., Winter 1986, at 55: Larry H.P. Lang & Robert H. Litzenberger. Dividend Announcements Cash Flo%
Signalling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis?, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 181. 190-91 (1989): William P Lloyd ct al,
Agency Costs and Dividend Payout Ratios, 24 QJ. BUS. & ECON. 19 (1985).
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If management could bond itself regarding the firm's dividend policy,
agency costs would decline, and the share price of the firm's equity would
rise. Given a credible commitment from management to shareholders to
distribute periodically a certain level of dividends, the ex ante reduction in
agency costs (i.e., the net present value of all potential agency costs that will
be eliminated by a commitment to maintain high dividend payouts) will be
reflected in the current share price of equity. If, however, management is
unable to make a credible commitment, the influence of dividends on agency
costs would be diminished to the ex post effect of dividends already paid
out.4
Stabilizing dividend policy serves to alleviate the bonding problem.
Managers generally commit themselves to distribute dividends four times per
year and at a constant fraction of earnings.42 In pursuing stable dividends,
though, they avoid drastic changes in dividend payments that might otherwise
be dictated by drastic changes in earnings; that is, they tend to "smooth"
dividend payments. 43 Over time, managers can develop a reputation-for
themselves and their firm-for maintaining a certain absolute level of
distribution." The reputation achieved through a stable dividend policy is
41. At time to, the market discounts the stock price to reflect all future agency costs. Suppose that at
time t, the firm enjoys accumulated earnings. Management can either inefficiently invest this cash or
distribute it to the shareholders. The market is uncertain about which choice management will make. Thus,
the price will be discounted to take account of the potential agency costs from time t, to the future and
those anticipated at time to. If management chooses to distribute the cash as a dividend, from an ex post
perspective, it avoids potential agency costs; therefore, part of the discount will disappear and the stock
price will rise. Yet, if there is no bonding regarding future dividends, the price will be discounted because
of potential agency costs from time t, to the future. This might explain the use of "special" dividends as
a defensive tactic against takeovers. See generally David J. Denis, Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout
Policy: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends, 45 J. FIN. 1433 (1990).
42. Ross Er AL., supra note 2. at 522, 544-45.
43. John Lintner conducted a series of interviews with corporate managers about their dividend
policies. Most of the managers thought of their dividend policies in terms of the proportion of earnings that
should be paid out, rather than the proportion that should be plowed back into the firm to finance growth.
They felt that shareholders were entitled to an adequate portion of the firm's earnings and that the firm
should have some long-term target payout ratio. A firm that consistently adhered to its payout ratio would
have to change its dividend whenever earnings changed. The managers in Lintner's survey, however, were
averse to such vacillation. They believed that shareholders favored a constant progression in dividends.
Thus, even when circumstances appeared to justify a substantial increase or decrease in their firm's
dividend, they made only partial moves toward their target payment. John Lintner, Distribution of Incomes
of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes, 46 AM. ECON. REv. 97, 99-101 (1956).
Fama and Babiak went on to calculate the target ratio and alignment rate for each firm. They found
that, on average, firms strive to distribute about 50% of their current net income and to move their old
dividend policy about one-third of the way towards this goal each year. Eugene F. Fama & H. Babiak.
Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis, 63 J. AM. STAT. ASs'N 1132 (1968). For example, if a firm's
payout ratio is 50% and the firm earns $120 a year, it will pay out $60 as a dividend. If. in the following
year. the firm earns $240 and the managers anticipate that this level of earnings will persist, the firm should
pay out $120 as dividend. The firm, however, will pay out only $80 that year, $100 the next year, and not
until the third year will it pay out a $120 dividend. Each year the firm will move one-third of the way
towards its goal. Managers tend to apply the same strategy if earnings decline. Managers will not change
their firm's dividend policy, however, to respond to what they see as temporary changes in earnings.
44. Easterbrook, supra note II, argues that agency-cost theory explains the stability of dividends, but
I do not find his reasoning convincing. Easterbrook contends that commitment to a fixed pattern of
dividends, irrespective of profit fluctuations, is more likely to push a firm to the capital markets for
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fragile; consequently, financially weak firms that are unable to maintain a
stable dividend policy will generally omit dividends altogether rather than
frequently decrease their payout.4 5 On the other hand, healthy firms that can
maintain a stable dividend policy are reluctant to omit dividends in the face of
temporary financial distress.' The longer the firm's record of stable
dividends, the higher the firm's reputation investment, and the more valuable
the firm's dividend commitment for reducing agency costs. 7
In other words, while a particular dividend payout reduces agency costs
by directly removing funds from the clutches of management, the stability of
dividend policy signals the commitment of management to abstain from future
expropriation of shareholder wealth. Consequently, as a firm's reputation for
dividend stability increases, the reputation serves as an increasingly powerful
bonding device and induces shareholders to attach higher value to the stock."
Of course, managers of a firm with a strong tradition of stable dividends might
still cut dividends in the future. As the reputation investment increases,
however, management's potential benefit from opportunistically cutting
dividends falls below the value of the squandered reputation investment. 9
financing investments. Yet the mere fact that a firm sets a payout target relative to earnings is equally likely
to compel the firm to raise money in the capital markets. Stability of dividends explains the phenomenon
of slow managerial adjustments towards the payout target, which is inexplicable from Easterbrook's
perspective. See Lintner, supra note 43. at 99-101.
On the role of reputation in assuring contractual performance, see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler.
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance. 89 J. POL EcoN. 615 (1981)
45. "Financially weak firms infrequently reduce the dividend. Rather than cut the dividend, they either
maintain a stable dividend or omit it altogether." Albert Eddy & Bruce Seifert. Dividend Changes of
Financially Weak Firms, 21 FIN. REv. 419. 429 (1986). The initial sample of the Eddy and Seifert study
included 216 firms that had a C (lowest possible) rating according to Value Line in at least one quarter
from 1978 to 1983. Id. at 421-22. Of these. 125 firms paid no dividend at all. and 16 firms made only
sporadic payments. The final sample included the remaining 75 firms. Forty firms in this sample omitted
their dividend during the period studied; only 10 of the firms reduced their dividend Most of the firms that
omitted their dividend did not resume it with any dispatch. In the few cases where firms did resume
payment, they did so at least two years after the omission. Id. at 424-25.
46. A study of dividend policy adjustments by 80 NYSE-listed firms in financial distress revealed that.
"absent binding [debt] covenants, dividends are cut more often than omitted, suggesting that managerial
reluctance is to the omission and not simply the reduction of dividends Moreover. managers of firms with
long dividend histories ... view dividend omissions as particularly unattractive - Harry DeAngelo &
Linda DeAngelo, Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An Empirical Investigaon of Troubled NYSE
Firms, 45 J. FiN. 1415, 1415 (1990).
The sample included 80 NYSE-listed firms that had at least three annual losses between 1980 and
1985. These firms reported very few losses in the 10 years before the onset of financial trouble. Id. at 1416
"[Olur sampling algorithm predominantly identifies firms that were healthy prior to their initial annual loss
during 1980-1985.... In short, our sample consists primarily of large, well-known industial firms that
were adversely affected by the economic downturn of the early 1980s." Id. at 1417
47. See id. at 1415.
48. This phenomenon explains why share repurchase plans cannot replace dividends, Management can
time share repurchases to redound to its advantage. A stable repurchase plan is not feasible, and thus cannot
effectively bond management. See Michael J. Barclay & Clifford \\ Smith. Jr.. Corporate Payout Policy
Cash Dividends Versus Open-Market Repurchases. 22 J. FIAN. ECoN 61. 65 (1988)
49. That is, the effect on managers of the resulting drop in the stock price would be greater than the
potential agency costs resulting from the dividend cut. i.e.. excess perquisites and suboptimal investment
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The agency-cost explanation of the dividend puzzle is both theoretically
and empirically convincing. It explains why managers distribute dividends even
in the face of high nonagency costs.50 A stable dividend policy is a powerful
management-made bond against abuse of discretion in the use of accumulated
earnings. But are stable dividends the best device for reducing agency costs?
Legislators have available to them a range of alternatives for reducing the
adverse effects of expansive managerial discretion. At one extreme, corporate
law might give management unbounded discretion, subject only to the
supervision of the takeover mechanism. At the other extreme, corporate law
might encourage managers to regulate themselves by employing debt financing,
which constrains managerial discretion by forcing the continual payout of
accumulated earnings in the form of interest. Between these two extremes there
are alternatives that shift only some of management's discretion to
shareholders--e.g., through periodic shareholder voting or option
mechanisms.5I For instance, corporate law might accord management
discretion over how to invest retained earnings but shift to shareholders the
decision of how much earnings to retain. This shareholder dividend discretion
might require shareholders to vote as a group or might provide shareholders
with an individual option. The efficiency of these alternatives will be assessed
below.
A stable dividend policy has costs and benefits. As we have seen, on the
benefit side, a stable dividend policy reduces agency costs and enhances a
firm's value. On the cost side, continually raising new funds in the capital
markets is expensive 2 and shareholder tax liability for the perpetually
maintained dividend payout is high. Additionally, as a firm's reputation
investment in dividend stability increases, its dividend policy becomes more
inflexible. Anxious to protect their reputation for consistency, managers will
be reluctant to cut dividends even when financial difficulties arise.53 A
dividend cut would lower the firm's stock price by an amount greater than the
decrease in firm value caused by poor business performance, as the price drop
would reflect the loss of the reputation investment as well. Similarly, managers
will be reluctant to make justified dividend increases, -because such increases
cannot be rolled back in the future to reflect lower business performance
without the risk of reputation loss. Both upward and downward dividend
50. See Jean Crockett & Irwin Friend, Dividend Policy in Perspective: Can Theory Explain Behavior?,
70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 603, 610 (1988) ("[Any resulting reduction of agency costs provides a true
rationale for (after-tax) dividend preference, other things equal.").
51. Another intermediate alternative is that of incentive compensation plans. While these plans are
effective in reducing agency costs to the extent that they produce management ownership of the firm, they
also destroy the benefits of separating ownership from control pro tanto. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 869-70 (1983); John C.
Coffee. Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. I. 16-24
(1986).
52. See Jay R. Ritter, The Costs of Going Public, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 269 (1987).
53. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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inflexibility will create opportunity costs and lead to a suboptimal investment
policy.
C. Alternatives to Stable Dividends for Reducing Agency Costs
1. The Takeover Mechanism
If management performs inefficiently-consumes excessive perquisites and
invests suboptimally-its actions will eventually be detected by the capital
markets, leading to a price decline and possibly to a takeover attempt. The
ever-present threat of a hostile takeover might cause management to invest an
optimal amount of retained earnings and to consume reasonable amounts of
perquisites. What do dividends add?
A takeover is a very expensive transaction. The costs to the bidder include
the bid price needed to induce target shareholders to tender their shares, and
sizable search and bidding expenses. 55 Additionally, bidders incur high
transaction costs, often disregarded by corporate law scholars, in achieving
effective control over the firm after the transfer of ownership is completed.5
Managers are free to deviate from efficient performance as long as they do not
cause a price decline that exceeds the costs of a takeover.57 In fact, managers
can safely allow the decline in the price of their firm's equity to exceed a
prospective raider's acquisition expenses, because a raider contemplating a
takeover would compare his certain costs against his expected value from the
takeover. Because there is always a risk regarding the success of a tender
offer, a raider will only launch a hostile takeover if the expected value of the
takeover attempt (the mismanagement discount on the target's equity multiplied
by the acquirer's chance of success) is greater than the acquisition expenses.
In recent years, increased use of defensive tactics and the adoption of state
antitakeover legislation have significantly reduced the probability of succeeding
in a takeover attempt.58 These developments have increased the costs and
54. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 14.1. at 599 (1986).
55. See Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley. The Economc Effects of Federal and State Regulations
of Cash Tender Offers. 23 J.L. & ECON. 371. 373 (1980) (estimating aeragc costs of takeoer to be as
high as 73% of pretakeover price); Gregg A. Jarrell et al.. The Market for Corporate Control The
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988. at 49. 51-52 (noting that various studies
have found target premiums in early 1980's to range from 19% to 30%) If there arc several bidders, the
costs of a takeover attempt are even greater.
56. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 99 (1970).
57. See Peter Crampton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory To Inform Takeover Regulation. 7
J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 27, 30-31 (1991); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer
Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 229 (1986).
58. See MERGERS AND RESTRUCTURING, supra note 16. at 481-526. 546-49, Roberta Romano. The
Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 11I. 112 (1987); Stout. supra note 2. at 691. see
also Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 55. at 373-74 (arguing that Williams Act and state antitakeover statutes
increase costs of takeovers by mandating disclosure of information and delaying acquisitions)
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risks of takeovers, expanding incumbent management's latitude to perform
inefficiently.
59
Dividend distribution is a comparatively cheap device for deterring
managerial opportunism. Although substantial dividend payouts do compel
firms to incur the transaction costs of raising new funds to finance future
investment and do force shareholders to pay more in taxes,'" these costs to
a firm are low in comparison with the inefficiencies permitted by the friction-
impaired market for corporate control.' In short, dividends are better at
reducing possible managerial inefficiency. 62
Dividends have an additional advantage over takeovers in their ability to
ensure efficient performance. While takeovers are triggered only after
management has made an inefficient investment or has consumed excessive
perquisites, dividend payouts lead to a serious review of management's
strategy as it attempts to raise new funds-before managers act in a self-
serving fashion.6 The takeover mechanism is an ex post response to
inefficient investment; even when a takeover is successful, it cannot retrieve
all the waste caused by suboptimal investment. A new management can
terminate a bad investment, but it cannot reimburse a firm for money already
spent in undertaking the investment (i.e., sunk costs). Additionally, a takeover
cannot compensate for the opportunity costs sustained during the period when
managers undertook the suboptimal investment. The takeover premium reflects
only what can still be saved by restoring efficiency.
On the other hand, dividend distributions reduce funds available for
excessive perquisite consumption and inefficient investment, and force firms
to finance new projects by raising funds on the primary market. Primary
market evaluations of the profitability of new projects include a careful
scrutiny of the firm's past and current performance.' This scrutiny (and its
anticipation by management) has the potential to improve the firm's overall
59. Commentators have suggested that the market for managerial services and the product markets will
restrain managerial opportunism. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88
J. POL. ECON. 288, 292-95 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 307-11 (1983). In the absence of takeovers, however, the market for
managerial services will not be very effective. Product markets provide little discipline in new industries
and in activities that yield substantial economic rents. See Jensen, Takeovers, supra note 29, at 322.
Moreover, the products market will not be very effective if the firm earns at least zero profits. See Fox,
supra note 9, at 143-50.
60. Costs of the public issuance of new securities include sizable underwriting, legal, accounting, and
printing expenses. The Securities Act of 1933 imposes additional costs on an issuer: disclosure duties,
potential liability for both the issuer and its directors and top management, and increased underwriter fees
to compensate underwriters for potential liability. See Fox, supra note 9, at 339-58.
61. Clark submits that any differential rate of return between projects financed by retained earnings
and those financed by new equity might reflect the relative costs of market discipline through takeovers
and new issues. See CLARK, supra note 54, at 600 n.10; see also supra note 35.
62. See CLARK, supra note 54, at 599-600.
63. See id. at 600 n.9.
64. See FOX, supra note 9, at 107-09.
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performance: past investments, current investments, and new investments.6
Primary market monitoring improves a firm's efficiency by reducing
management's expropriation of shareholders. Sizable dividend payouts,
therefore, can save a firm the costs of both bad investments and a consequent
takeover.
Market review of management's prospective strategies does, in a way,
restrict management's business discretion. The advance review of new issues,
however, is generally performed by professional investors: investment banks
and other sophisticated financial institutions.' Most banks have a significant
reputation investment to safeguard; consequently, their opinion on the quality
of an issuing firm's business strategy is properly motivated. Sometimes banks
serve as the underwriters of new issues; consequently, they often have a
financial investment to protect as well. 67 Indeed, the capital markets will
consistently do better than management in assessing the value of potential
investment projects.68
The investors who evaluate management's strategy in advance-when
deciding whether to buy stock in a new issue-are the same investors who
indirectly trigger the takeover mechanism by selling a firm's stock after
assessing management's strategy. Nevertheless, dividends have a major
disadvantage as a disciplinary mechanism relative to takeovers. While the
takeover threat applies indiscriminately to all firms, dividend policy bonds only
those managers who choose to adhere to a stable dividend policy. If managers
want to expropriate shareholder wealth, they can at any time reduce dividend
distributions and finance new investment with retained earnings. Acting in this
way, management can isolate itself from the discipline of the primary capital
markets. The higher the potential for expropriation of shareholder wealth in a
given firm's ownership structure, the more likely it is that managers will take
advantage of their principals.
69
65. See supra note 35.
66. Investors evaluate business plans either when they are first announced or later %hen they are
undertaken. The average investor's opinion is reflected in the stock pnce. Both the assumption of an
efficient market and the fact that an average of several forecasts is better than a single prediction suggest
that the market will not do worse than management. For a discussion of efficient markets and the predictive
value of average forecasts, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman. The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549. 581 (1984).
67. Id. at 613; see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate LDabil. Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857. 888-96 (1984); Reinier H. Kraakman. Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-
Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 53 (1986).
68. See FOX. supra note 9 (presenting analysis of relative advantage of capital markets over
management of management-controlled firms in selecting investments); see also supra note 35.
69. Several findings support this view. First, capital markets supply a relatively small portion of the
funds that U.S. corporations need for capital expenditures. Most funds for new investment come from
retained earnings and depreciation reserves. See BAUMOL, supra note 3. at 67-69: GORDON DONALDsON,
MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH 43-46 (1984); supra note 2. Second. the divergence between shareholders
and management is reflected in differences in rate of return between owner-controlled (high return) and
manager-controlled (low return) firms. See WILUIAM A. MCEACIIERN. MANAGERIAL COrTROL AND
PERFORMANCE 21-56, 111 (1975) (surveying empirical studies and concluding that "owner-controlled firms
provided higher average returns to shareholders than manager-controlled firms"): John R. McKean & John
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Agency-cost theory predicts, however, that shareholders will discount the
risk of expropriation and thereby provide management with incentives to
abstain from such behavior. Agency-cost theory is a perfect-foresight
model-it assumes that shareholders are always able to predict agency costs
fully. Reality does not support an assumption of perfect foresight. The market
is replete with occasions for managerial opportunism. The most notable
evidence of the market's failure to detect managerial opportunism is the
prevalence of takeovers that attempt to economize on agency-cost
inefficiencies.70 Put differently, there are some inefficient firms in the market
whose managers are free, within the limits set by the takeover market, to avoid
bonding through the use of stable dividend policy.
Stable dividend policy is not the most efficacious of bonding mechanisms.
A stable dividend policy retards managerial abuse of discretion better than does
the takeover mechanism only for those firms that choose to bond themselves,
i.e., firms pursuing efficiency.
2. Debt Financing
Another method management can use to bond itself to reduce agency costs
is debt financing. Debt reduces agency costs in three ways. First, a firm whose
capital structure is dominated by debt has committed its cash flows to making
interest payments. Because managers have less discretion over payments on
debt than over dividends, increased debt reduces managerial discretion over the
allocation of free cash flow. 7' Debt bonds managers to distribute free cash
flow as interest.72 Second, the penalty for defaulting on interest payments is
bankruptcy, a fate that portends grave consequences for management. The
bankruptcy risk further encourages efficient performance. Third, debt generates
J. Kania, An Industry Approach to Owner-Manager Control and Profit Performance. 51 J. Bus. 327 (1978)
(presenting theories and conflicting evidence). Third, firms with a higher percentage of managers on the
board (a gauge of separation of control from ownership) retain a higher percentage of earnings. See O.E.
Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032, 1047-51 (1963).
These findings together suggest that a significant number of firms opt not to use dividends as a device for
reducing agency costs, and that this tendency increases as ownership separates farther from control.
70. The literature regarding takeovers suggests many motives for acquisitive activity; among these is
reducing agency costs. See, e.g., Jensen, Takeovers, supra note 29, at 321-22 (attributing takeover activity
to manager-shareholder conflicts over free cash flow).
71. Two articles have recently presented complementary models of free cash flow. In both, managers
and investors disagree over operating decisions. The model proposed by Harris and Raviv assumes that
managers want to continue the firm's current operations even if shareholders prefer liquidation. See Milton
Harris & Artur Raviv, Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt, 45 J. FIN. 321, 324-25 (1990).
Debt mitigates this problem by granting investors (bondholders) the option to force liquidation if cash flows
are poor. The Stulz model assumes that managers want to invest all available funds even if distributing
dividends is better for investors. See Ren6 M. Stulz, Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing
Policies, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5-8 (1990). Here debt mitigates the problem by forcing interest payments and
reducing free cash flows.
72. Michael Jensen argues that managers ought to achieve high levels of bonding by having their firm
assume a high level of debt. See Jensen, Takeovers, supra note 29, at 322-23.
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valuable information about the firm that is often useful for assessing
management's decisions.73
Debt financing has benefits. The bonding effect of debt can improve firm
efficiency. Debt brings default early in the path of declining efficiency-before
inefficient or self-serving managers destroy much of a firm's value. Debt
possesses a tax advantage over dividends." Debt financing also has costs.
Debt distorts a firm's investment policy. Debt reduces a firm's resiliency
because interest payments are less flexible than dividends. This inflexibility
could cause either suboptimal managerial risk taking" or an inordinate resort
to wasteful bankruptcy proceedings.76 Moreover, the issuance of debt
securities involves transaction costs, increased costs due to the risk of
bankruptcy,77 and opportunity costs resulting from constraints introduced in
bond indentures. 78 Debt financing generates its own set of agency costs as
well: Bondholders face the risk of expropriation by shareholders who might
engineer a shift to riskier investments or a dilution of debtholders' priority
through an asset transfer to shareholders. 79  Bondholders compensate
themselves for these agency costs by charging higher prices for their loan of
capital, thus increasing the cost of debt financing.
73. "First, the mere ability of the firm to make its contractual payments to debtholdcrs pro% Ides
information. Second. in default management must placate creditors to avoid liquidation, either through
informal negotiations or through formal bankruptcy proceedings. This process. although costl,, disseminates
considerable information to investors." Hams & Raviv. supra note 71. at 321
74. Corporations receive no deduction for profits paid out to shareholders in the form of dtiidends
Corporations receive a full deduction for profits paid out to bondholders and other creditors in the form
of interest. I.R.C. § 163 (1994). The importance of this advantage is debated See .MRG RS AND
RESTRUCTURING, supra note 16. at 406-07. 412: J Fred Weston. It'iat AM Hate Wrought. FI" MG.IrT.
Summer 1989, at 29, 34-36.
75. Managers have an undiversified asset-specific investment in the firm-hunan capital-that
produces risk-averse investment decisions. Because high leserage increases the riskiness of manages
human capital investment, due to the higher potential for bankruptcs. significant debt %%ill cause manager%
to be even more conservative in their investment decisions See Jensen & Meckling. supra note 6. at
349-50. 352-53. Similarly. as leverage increases, managers tend to invest more in assets that arc capable
of serving as a pledge for debt, whether or not efficicnc) dictates that the firnm in% cst in such as.sets See
Moshe Kim & Vojislav Maksimovic. Debt and Input Misallocation. 45 J FIN 795. 814-15 t1990) Debt
can also lead to a suboptimal amount of investment. See Elazar Berkovitch & E Han Kim. Finantal
Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and Under-Investnent In enttves. 45 J FIN 765. 765 0990).
Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracrng" An Analtsis of Bond Cotenanti. 7
J. FIN. ECON. 117, 119 (1979) 'arguing that opportunity costs imposed b) debt coenants could lead to
suboptimal investment).
76. See Mark B Baribeau. Leverage Risk in the A'onfin inctal Corporate Sector. 24 Bti., Ecu' 34.
36-39 (1989) (arguing that leserage risk in nonfinanciil corporate sector is rising and is high enough to
cause above-average financial distress among firms should cash floss from current operations or asset sales
be jeopardized during economic downturn)
77. See, e.g., Jongmoo Jay Choi et al., Optimum Corporate Leverage wtth Risk) Debt A Demand
Approach, 12 J. FIN. RES. 129, 137-39 (1989); Stewart C_ Myers. The Capital Structure Puzzle. 39 J. FI.
575 (1984). This risk reduces the value of equity claims and increases the pnce of debt. for example.
through increased interest rates.
78. See Smith & Warner, supra note 75. at 125-47
79. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6. at 334-37. Additionally. if the firm has diseretionar)
investments, managers may forgo those investments that primarily benefit bondholders See Stewart C
Myers. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. 5 J. FiN. EcoN 147. 149 (1977)
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The cost of debt varies among firms according to their size, amount of
tangible assets that could serve as collateral, reputation, riskiness of business
activity, control and ownership structure, and field of industry. For some firms,
maintaining a significant degree of leverage is impractical. These firms cannot
use debt as a permanent bonding device. Moderate leverage is less expensive,
but it does not effectively bond management-it accords management enough
leeway to perform inefficiently but not default on the debt. Ironically, although
high leverage is more expensive than moderate leverage, it does not have much
greater bonding power than moderate leverage: Bondholders are reluctant to
exercise their right to file for the bankruptcy of their debtor, both because
default then becomes a very likely consequence and because they have a high
stake at risk.80 In this respect, the "privatization of bankruptcy" reduces the
bonding effect of debt.8'
The improved efficiency resulting from debt financing often has little to
do with the debt itself. The increased efficiency is frequently the result of
"privatization," i.e., concentration of ownership.82 Debt financing enables a
group of entrepreneurs, such as a leveraged buy-out (LBO) partnership, to gain
control of a firm and concentrate its ownership. Tight control over the firm
enables owners to monitor management's performance better and to reward
management in accordance with that performance, through the mechanisms of
promotion and discharge. Increased concentration of control usually leads to
increased efficiency. The fact that debt frequently facilitates the transfer of
control causes some observers to mistake the effects of concentrated ownership
for the effects of debt financing. Very high leverage is used as a temporary
device to achieve control and efficient operation of a firm. Once the LBO
partnership has accomplished these goals, the firm's management immediately
reduces the firm's debt obligations. 83 The transience of high leverage suggests
that high levels of debt are not effective as a permanent bonding device.
80. In fact, very high leverage transforms debt into "equity." If any management is to perform
efficiently, it must take the same risks as it would take under full equity financing. If management does
not reduce the riskiness of its investments in the face of high leverage, the risk of defaulting on the debt
will be high. If management invests conservatively, the firm's profitability will plummet and, again, the
risk of default will be high. Bondholders recognize that efficient performance entails managerial risktaking
and thus acknowledge that they should behave as equity holders. In other words. bondholders will not
exercise their right to file for bankruptcy proceedings in every default. Rather, the cases in which
bondholders exercise their right will be similar to those in which bondholders in a firm with only moderate
debt would exercise the right. Management recognizes that high leverage is not materially different from
moderate debt, and the bonding effect dissipates.
81. The expression "privatization of debt" is used by Jensen to describe the practice of quick out-of-
court reorganizations by highly leveraged firms that get into financial trouble frequently. See Jensen,
Eclipse, supra note 31, at 72.
82. See Jay 0. Light, The Privatization of Equity, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 62, 62-63.
83. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,
98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 253 (1990) (suggesting that management buy-out transactions are transient devices
that allow management to go private in order to adjust their package of incentives); see also MERGERS AND
RESTRUCTURING, supra note 16, at 401, 408-09.
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In sum, moderate leverage has a limited bonding effect. High leverage also
has a limited bonding effect, but the costs it imposes on a firm are staggering.
Therefore, firms must often assume debt for reasons unrelated to bonding.'4
While moderate leverage can achieve a particular bonding level more cheaply
than can dividends,85 debt, for several reasons, is probably not better than
dividends for reducing agency costs. First, bonding through debt financing is
not a viable option for all firms. Firms with volatile profits or intangible assets
cannot guarantee constant payment of interest or secure loans; they are thus
unable to use high leverage. Second, while moderate leverage offers limited
bonding, dividends can potentially bond the full earning power of the firm.
Third, debt places a minimum performance requirement on management: As
long as management stays above a certain threshold, it can deviate from
efficiency with impunity. Shareholders will gain from the bonding effect of
debt only if the minimum performance threshold is high.6
3. Shareholder Dividend Voting
Between the takeover mechanism and debt financing there is the
alternative of shifting discretion over dividend policy to shareholders.
Managers could implement this alternative in several ways. For example, they
could amend the corporate charter to transfer voting rights on dividend policy
matters to a majority of shareholders. Or managers could amend the charter to
add a clause compelling the firm to distribute dividends on predetermined dates
in amounts calculated by a predetermined formula. 7 Also, the firm could
issue a new class of stock with rights to vote on dividend policy." The use
of such methods in the modem corporate world has been, to say the least, rare.
A firm that commits itself, in its charter, to a dividend policy with a
predetermined dividend payout ratio and fixed distribution dates would reduce
84. Myers' "pecking order" theory explains that debt financing allows a firm to strke the proper
balance between asymmetric information costs and financial distress costs See Myers. supra note 77. at
581-85. A firm might also assume debt in order to facilitate the transfer of control.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
86. In other words, to the extent that leverage bonds managers. it benefits shareholders by enabling
the firm to obtain cheaper debt financing. The pnce of debt, however. reflects only the net present value
of the potential benefits to bondholders from managerial bonding. All of the benefits to shareholders may
not be reflected in the debt price.
87. 1 do not attempt here to analyze all possible changes to a firm's charter that could bond
management to distribute dividends. Instead, I analyze onl) a few examples that illustrate the tension
inherent in efforts to reduce agency costs. Shareholders can reduce agency costs either b) restricting their
agents' discretion or by monitoring their agents. Both of these methods will produce inflexible business
operations and lower efficiency. In addition to this tension, where there are numerous principals
(shareholders) and agents (managers), collective action problems and pnsoner's dilemmas arise.
88. Of course, each such charter amendment or new issue of special stock should protect against future
charter amendments that nullify shareholder dividend rights without the approval of a sufficient number
of shareholders. For a more elaborate discussion of opportunistic charter amendments by corporate insiders
(managers and controlling shareholders), see Jeffrey N. Gordon. The Mandatory Structure of Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1573-85 (1989).
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its agency costs by preventing management from changing dividend policy for
self-serving reasons. A payout ratio that achieves maximum reduction in
agency costs-that is, full distribution of earnings-is not necessarily the
optimal payout. Full distribution would maximize shareholders' tax liability
and the transaction costs of obtaining new financing. A quick comparison of
any charter-controlled distribution policy with the current practice of stable
dividends reveals the disadvantage of the former. The fixed-distribution method
enjoys much less flexibility than does existing stable dividend policy: It does
not allow for yearly reconsideration and commits the firm to fixed distributions
on fixed dates. Since business realities often justify changing the timing of a
dividend payment in a given period (for example, where a temporary profitable
opportunity has surfaced) or changing the payout amount, such a method
imposes high opportunity costs on a firm.
Shareholder dividend voting seems more attractive. In theory, shifting the
power to decide on dividend matters to shareholders should eliminate the
agency-cost problem of free cash flow, because the principals themselves
would make the payout decision. Moreover, shareholders would retain the
flexibility needed to adjust dividend policy to business conditions. If the
majority of shareholders believe that management is inefficient and that the
internal profitability of the firm is lower than the rate of return available in
alternative investments, they can vote to compel dividend distribution. The
shareholders need never actually compel dividend distribution-the bonding
effect results from the mere threat to compel distribution.89 If shareholders
never demand dividends and yet always pose a substantial threat to compel
dividend payout, firms might achieve a bonding effect without incurring the
costs of paying stable dividends-tax liability and the transaction costs of
fundraising. The profitability of the investment opportunities available to a firm
would determine whether or not to distribute earnings. Optimal investment
would result.
In practice, however, shareholder dividend voting suffers from a number
of defects. First, frequent dividend decisions would require frequent
shareholder notification and meetings. The costs to shareholders of seeking
information about past and future firm performance would also be high. The
voting alternative could perhaps be improved if shareholders only voted on
dividend policy during the regular annual meetings.9" Although this practice
89. This threat resembles the threat to elect new management, a power that shareholders already
possess but are reluctant to exercise. Electing to receive cash dividends would be a more limited action,
a power that shareholders would be more inclined to exercise for several reasons. First, less uncertainty is
involved in selecting a dividend payout level than in electing a new management. Second, a wrong decision
about dividends can be corrected by reinvesting in the firm. Third, the information needed for a vote over
dividends is more limited than that needed to justify the replacement of management.
90. The Italian Civil Code, Company Law Section 2328(7), mandates a shareholder vote on dividend
policy at every annual meeting. 6 COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS AND TRADE LAWS para. 2433 (Louis F. Del
Duca & Patrick L. Del Duca eds., 1983).
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would reduce the costs associated with voting too frequently, it would also
reduce pro tanto the shareholders' ability to adjust dividend policy to business
conditions.
Second, conferring voting rights on shareholders might seem to force them
to forfeit the benefits of retaining management as an agent in the first place.9'
Yet the conferral of voting rights by itself does not mandate a forfeiture: While
the vote provides shareholders with an opportunity to contest the views of
management, the shareholders can continue to follow management's
recommendations. The more serious defect of dividend voting is that
shareholders may exercise their rights to vote inefficiently due to apathy and
free-rider problems.92 In fact, these problems might return to managers
complete discretion over dividends. Managers would present their
recommended dividend policy, and, given apathy and free-rider problems, the
recommendation could generally be expected to prevail. Shareholder voting
will only reduce agency costs to the extent that shareholders control the
dividend decision.93
The voting mechanism, however, does bond management in ways that
other mechanisms do not. The mere possibility of shareholder intervention
would deter a great deal of inefficient management behavior.9' For instance,
it is conceivable that if management proposed a blatantly inefficient dividend
resolution, a sufficient number of shareholders would vote against
management.
Furthermore, the growing presence of large, institutional shareholders in
U.S. firms will produce better voting patterns and better monitoring." The
logical case for the ability of large investors to reduce agency costs is clear:
A shareholder's net benefits from monitoring increase as the size of her
holdings increases, and a shareholder's net benefits from not monitoring (free
riding or exiting) decrease as the size of her holdings increases.' The
91. Usually management is better informed, better suted. and better equipped to decide a firm's
dividend policy than are shareholders. But management is not always properly motivated. This is the heart
of the agency problem. Granting shareholders formal decisionmaking power over dividends, even though
the power is not used in practice, will reduce agency costs. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
92. See CLARK, supra note 54, at 389-93.
93. To the extent that shareholder votes uniformly confirm management's dividend preferences. the
value of dividend voting as a bending device declines. In such a case efficient management would have
to bond itself again by always recommending a stable dividend policy.
94. In current practice, if management opts not to bond its performance through a stable dividend
policy, and the corporation performs poorly, shareholders can either sell their shares or wait for a takeover.
The voting mechanism creates a response that is easier to implement than a full-scale proxy fight and more
reliable than waiting for a takeover. For example, in Italy, where the voting mechanism is mandatory,
management proposes a payout ratio. If management's proposal fails, then each shareholder can propose
another payout ratio. See FRANCESCO GALGANO. 3(2) DIRirrO CiviLE E COMMERCIALE 206-09 (1990). I
thank Edoardo Courir for his translation of, and assistance in obtaining, the Italian matenal.
95. See Bernard Black. Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor %bice. 39
UCLA L. REv. 81 I, 827 (1992) ("At the end of 1990, institutions owned 53% of the equity in U.S. public
companies, up from 45% in 1986 and 38% in 1981.").
96. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and Uncertain Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism.
79 GEo. LJ. 445, 453-63 (1991). see also Anup Agrawal & Gershon N. Mandelker. Large Shareholders
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practical case against institutional investors is much less clear. The common
anxieties about institutional investors-that they are incompetent monitors and
decision makers, that they will divert corporate funds away from other
shareholders, that they suffer from myopia-are largely unfounded.
Institutional investors will be able to make the dividend decision: Good traders
and fund managers are already skilled evaluators of corporate performance, and
the dividend decision involves periodic considerations of policy matters rather
than day-to-day administration of the details of a corporation's operations.97
Institutional investors will not divert corporate funds, because they are subject
to fiduciary duties and public disclosure requirements, and because other
institutional investors, including the corporation's management, will be
monitoring their performance.98 Institutional investors are simply not very
nearsighted.99 The concentration of ownership among sophisticated financial
institutions that is occurring in U.S. equity markets will ensure that shareholder
dividend options are intelligently exercised.
While shifting power to shareholders by providing them voting rights
would be expensive and cumbersome, it should be compared not to some ideal
mechanism, but rather to the current practice of stable dividends. The costs of
bonding through stable dividends include high taxes, transaction costs for new
issues, and opportunity costs due to the inflexibility of dividend policy; the
costs of shareholder voting include the cost of informing shareholders and
opportunity costs due to the inflexibility of an annually adjusted dividend
policy. Although it would be hard to make an a priori determination of which
set of costs is higher, yearly voting should prove less inflexible than a
predetermined long-term payout ratio. Moreover, shareholder voting has the
major advantage of saving shareholders the full tax liability of maintaining a
stable dividend policy and the transaction costs of new issues. These savings
should prove high in relation to shareholders' costs in obtaining information.
and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 25 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143 (1990) (concluding that existence of large shareholders leads to better
monitoring of managers); Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L.
& EcON. 375, 390 (1983) (finding strong link between management and owner interests in profit-
maximizing behavior); Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The
Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 130-31 (1987) (arguing that
sophisticated, well-informed shareholders such as institutions are more likely than less informed
shareholders to vote in accordance with their own economic interests); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986) (arguing that owners of
large blocks of shares have greater incentives to monitor managers).
On the other hand, if the interest of the large shareholder is aligned with the interest of management.
then the presence of a large shareholder would decrease the effectiveness of a voting mechanism. See, e.g.,
John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 260-62
(1988) (suggesting that large blockholders tend to vote with management in proxy cases).
97. See Black, supra note 95, at 852-55.
98. See id. at 855-61.
99. See id. at 862--64; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for the Institutional Investor, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 863 (1991); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk,
ime, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 277, 308-09, 314-18 (1990).
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4. Shareholder Dividend Options
An improved version of shareholder dividend voting might involve fixing
the distribution date and the payout ratio, but rendering the actual distribution
optional to each shareholder. On the fixed date, each shareholder could choose,
independently of other shareholders, between receiving a cash dividend or a
stock dividend."°  Exercising the option intelligently would require
shareholders to monitor management's past performance and future plans.
With shareholder dividend options, as with shareholder dividend voting,
it might seem that shareholders forfeit the benefits of retaining professional
management. Dividend options. however, present an additional alternative to
those shareholders who wish to contest management's recommendations
regarding dividend policy. With dividend options, those shareholders who wish
to retain the benefit of having an agent can simply follow management's
recommendations, but the fate of shareholders who reject management's
proposal is not determined by the will of the majority. The option system
provides a dissenting shareholder with an individual right that she can exercise
independently of the decisions of other shareholders.
The costs of informing shareholders under the option mechanism are
equivalent to the costs of dividend voting, which, as explained above, are
lower than the costs of a stable dividend policy. The problems of apathy and
free riding, which are acute under the collective decision making required by
the voting mechanism, are much abated by the individual decision making that
the option mechanism requires. With dividend voting, the majority determines
the dividend payout for all shareholders. A small shareholder should not and
would not assume that her vote will be pivotal; rather, she would assume that
the other shareholders will determine her fate. By contrast, with the option
mechanism, each shareholder selects her own dividend payout ratio. A
shareholder could invest in firm-specific information and use that information
to choose what portion of her share of the firm's earnings to receive in cash
and what portion to reinvest. Alternatively, the shareholder could blindly
follow management's recommendation (if she trusts it) or mimic the actions
of large shareholders (if she believes in their wisdom)."0t
The dividend option can be viewed in another way. A shareholder can
influence the behavior of management either by voting ("voice") or by selling
100. Shareholder di\ idend options would be granted to each holder of a corporation'% common stock
Firms offering shareholder dividend options could include preferred stock in their capital structure, but the,
need not allow holders of preferred stock to participate in the option program. To expand the scope of
dividend options, a firm might provide holders of preferred stock with a dividend option as well. A holder
of preferred stock could then periodically elect to receive cash di. dends or preferred stock dividends To
preserve the dividend priority of preferred stock, the preferred dividend options must be exereised before
the common dividend options
101. Large shareholders would find it worihwhile to inform others about their decisions so as to
achieve informed control over management.
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her shares ("exit"). Usually, voice is uttered collectively while exit is
undertaken individually. In fact, the dividend option is a special alternative that
is partly "voice" and partly "exit." Exercising the option requires a decision of
whether or not to invest additional funds in the firm. If a shareholder opts for
cash dividends, she makes a partial exit and also gives voice to her opinion
concerning the profitability of the firm." 2 Thus, with dividend options,
unlike with dividend voting, shareholders' voice and exit are individualized.
If management has performed admirably, shareholders will opt for stock
dividends, and the firm will avoid the transaction costs of a new issue.
Because management will strive to persuade shareholders to opt for stock
dividends, it has a strong incentive both to perform efficiently and to provide
sufficient information to shareholders. With a voting mechanism, management
need only persuade a majority of the attending shareholders to prevent any
distribution. With the option mechanism, any unpersuaded shareholder can opt
for the cash dividend.
10 3
The dividend option for shareholders would cover all profits, and would
come into play only to the extent that there are profits. Herein, however, lies
the disadvantage of the option relative to debt. To the extent that debt bonds
managers, it sets a minimum performance requirement. If bankruptcy is costly
to managers, because they might lose the benefits of control or reputation, then
debt creates incentives to work harder, consume fewer perquisites, and make
better investment decisions, in order to reduce the chance of bankruptcy.' °
The option mechanism, in contrast, provides no such incentive for managers
to achieve a certain level of performance. If the firm has no earnings,
shareholders would not receive dividend options, and management would
remain undisciplined. 5 The option comes into play mainly as a preventive
measure: It prevents the waste of profits already earned. The option, by itself,
does not compel the origination of profits.
The agency costs of the separation of ownership and control include both
inefficient generation of profits and inefficient use of profits. To the extent that
a firm does not bond itself against any of these risks, the market will discount
the price of the firm's equity. The option mechanism would not affect firms
102. For a discussion of the mechanisms of voice and exit and their optimal mix. see generally
ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExiT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
103. Each element of the option can be modified to suit the specific needs of a firm. For instance, if
fixed distribution dates produce too much inflexibility for a firm, the firm might accord discretion to
management over the timing of dividends while still predetermining the full payout ratio and granting
shareholders the option of receiving cash or stock dividends. Because the full payout ratio is certain.
shareholders would be protected against expropriation. Management could determine dividend distribution
dates based on business plans. Management would have an incentive to explain the reasons for its decision
about any selected distribution date. Otherwise, the capital markets would interpret a remote date as a sign
of anticipated inefficient performance and would discount the stock price.
104. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial
Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 107, 130-31 (John J. McCall cd.,
1982).
105. Although if the firm has no profits, the problem of free cash flow is not really a problem.
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whose inefficiency results in no profits, or only negligible profits, but other
control mechanisms do affect such firms. For example, competition in product
markets will, over time, drive inefficient firms out of business. Moreover,
implementation of the option mechanism would probably lead firms to increase
their leverage. Under the option mechanism, firms would substitute external
finance, which could take the form of either debt or equity, for internal
finance, which is equity. 1°6 Dividend options would lead indirectly to
increased debt financing and would thereby provide managers with incentives
to achieve a certain level of performance.
On the other hand, the option mechanism will materially affect firms that
generate free cash flows. Usually these are mature firms without growth
opportunities. The dominant agency-cost risk in these firms is the inefficient
utilization of profits that have already been earned. 0 7 Under the option
mechanism, shareholders will have control over the firm's earnings. If the
investment policy pursued by management does not seem profitable,
shareholders would opt for cash dividends and invest their wealth in another
firm. Such control over free cash flow would substantially reduce
management's capacity to make suboptimal investments and poor
acquisitions.'l°
Providing shareholders with discretion over earnings retention through the
option mechanism would reduce the agency costs of firms and improve the
allocative efficiency of the economy. The option mechanism would channel
resources (accumulated earnings) to their best use rather than allow them to be
employed wherever generated.'0 9  The option mechanism would also
106 See Fox. supra note 9. at 393. This claim presupposes the likely proposition that shareholders
with dividend options will allow firms to retain less earnings than they do currently.
107. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
108. The French have recognized the merits of dividend options French Company Law mandates an
annual shareholder vote on the allocation of a corporation's profits. If the shareholders decide to distribute
profits, the corporation must provide each shareholder with the option of receiving either cash or stock
dividends. The shareholders' power to distmbute prohits is limited by a requirement that the corporation
allocate 5% of each year's profits to a "legal reserve." Even this small requirement does not obtain in those
years in which the legal reserve exceeds 10% of the corporation's capital. See JEAN-PIERRE LE GALL &
PAUL MOREL. FRENCH COMPANY LAW 140-41, 172 (2d ed. 1992).
109. Williamson suggested that this was the main reason for the conglomeration of fimis into the
multidivision structure (the M-form). in which a firm divides its corporate activities so as to permit the
subunits to operate independently of each other as profit centers OuVER E. WILLIAMS N. MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 136-38 (1975). The M-form organization is a
response to ineffectise direct capital markets discipline and the inefficiency of the takeover mechamsm as
a means of disciplining managements. In \Williamson's vie,, the M-form organization is similar to a
miniature capital market but with functions performed administratively by the general office rather than the
actual market. Cash flows are not automatically returned for reinvestment to the operating unit that
generated the cash. Instead, that unit is exposed to internal competition with other projects proposed
throughout the firm. and the general office assigns the cash to those projects possessIng what it believes
to be the best prospects. In other words, conglomeration is a means of facilitating an investment of funds
generated by certain operating units in projects of other units. Id. at 141-48. -in many respects. thu
assignment of cash flows to high -Yield uses is the most fundamental attribute of the M.form
enterprise ..... Id. at 148. Enhancing the control of the capital markets over the transfer of funds between
independent firms assigns to the capital markets the role of the ultimate M-form organization.
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maximize shareholder preferences by allowing each shareholder to select her
unique dividend payout ratio and the level of discretion she wishes to provide
to management.
II. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ADOPTION OF AN OPTION MECHANISM
The option mechanism is an efficient means of shifting control over
dividend policy from managers to shareholders. Firms inclined to provide the
capital markets with such control, however, face a major impediment: tax
distortion of the dividend decision. Inefficient firms, which attempt to isolate




Under the U.S. corporate tax system, cash dividends and stock dividends
are taxed differently. Cash dividends are considered income to the recipient
and taxed immediately at ordinary income rates, while stock dividends are
exempted from current taxation and taxed at capital gains rates when the new
shares are sold."' The distinction between the taxation of the two kinds of
dividend is based upon two assumptions. The first assumption is that
shareholders should be taxed only after they realize a gain, either by extracting
assets from the corporation or by selling shares. The second assumption is that
gain from the sale of shares should be taxed favorably as a capital gain, while
gain from the extraction of assets should be taxed unfavorably as ordinary
income."' Receipt of a pro rata stock dividend is not a realization event
because each shareholder preserves the same proportional interest she had in
the firm before the distribution."' Thus, taxes are deferred until a realization
110. Section 301(a) of the Internal Revenue Code requires taxpayers, with some exceptions, to include
in gross income "any distribution of property [including cash) made by a corporation to a shareholder with
respect to its stock." I.R.C. § 301(a) (1994). The Internal Revenue Code also declares that a taxpayer's
gross income "does not include the amount of any distribution of the stock of a corporation made by such
corporation to its shareholders with respect to its stock." Id. § 305(a); see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920).
11I. Richard B. Stone, Back to Fundamentals: Another Version of the Stock Dividend Saga, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 898, 898 (1979). Currently, the Internal Revenue Code treats capital gains favorably.
I.R.C. § 1(h) (taxing net capital gains at 28% and taxing ordinary income in the highest tax bracket at
39.6%). Even when tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income were equal (between 1986 and 1991),
however, capital gains received preferential treatment because of the substantial benefit of tax deferral. See,
e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 722, 730-37
(1990).
112. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 202-03 (holding that pro rata distribution of common stock
on common stock is not taxable). The tax treatment of stock dividends derives from the realization
requirement.
We are clear that not only does a stock dividend really take nothing from the property of the
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date, which is usually the day on which the taxpayer sells the shares.
The Internal Revenue Code does not treat all stock dividends with such
generosity. The Code takes a "constructive receipt" approach to stock
dividends payable in lieu of money. A shareholder's receipt of an option for
either a cash or a stock dividend is considered a realization event even if the
shareholder opts for stock dividends." 3 The Code also taxes as ordinary
income disproportionate stock distributions. Even in the absence of an election,
if some shareholders receive a cash dividend and other shareholders receive a
stock dividend, the shareholders who receive the stock dividend are taxed as
if they received a cash dividend." 4 These quirky aspect of the tax law would
prevent a firm from voluntarily adopting an option mechanism. Granting each
shareholder an option to receive either cash or stock dividends that covered all
earnings would result in taxation of all earnings, regardless of how
shareholders exercised their options. Full taxation of annual earnings destroys
one of the most important rationales for operating a business in the corporate
form."1
5
Under the current tax system, firms will regard granting a dividend option
as equivalent to distributing cash dividends. A firm ought to distribute cash
dividends only to the point at which the benefits of distribution (reducing
agency costs) equal its costs (transaction costs and extra taxes)." t6 The
dividend payout ratio of a stable dividend policy reflects such an equilibrium
point." 7 It is likely that the optimal payout ratio will be less than one, i.e.,
that a firm should distribute less than its full earnings. The proposed option
mechanism over all the firm's earnings would not produce the optimal amount
of distribution because it would create tax liability as if the firm distributed all
of its earnings, i.e., as if the firm's payout ratio were equal to one. Any option
would therefore be limited to those earnings already committed for distribution.
corporation and add nothing to that of the shareholder, but that the antecedent accumulation of
profits evidenced thereby, while indicating that the shareholder is the ncher because of an
increase of his capital, at the same time shows he has not realized or reccieid any income in
the transaction.
Id. at 212. But cf. Koshland v. Helvering. 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (holding that distribution of common stock
on preferred stock is taxable because class of preferred shareholders increased its interest in corporation
vis-A-vis common shareholders).
113. I.R.C. § 305(b)(1). One shareholder's receipt of a dividend option is sufficient to deem other
shareholders who receive stock dividends as extractors of assets from the firm. See Treas. Reg.
§ 305-2(a)(5) (1994).
114. I.R.C. § 305(b)(2).
I 15. See BORIS I. BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTiCF, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 5.0][5] (1994); CARY & EISENBERG. supra note 7. at 95-97.
116. In countries where dividends are not taxed more heavily than capital gains. firms adopt higher
dividend payout ratios. See. e.g., Allen J. Michel & Israel Shaked, Country and Industr, Influence on
Dividend Policy: Evidence from Japan and the U.S.A., 13 J. Bus. FI N. & ACCT. 365. 380 (1986) (finding
that "payout ratios of the sampled Japanese industries were higher than those of their American
counterparts").
117. The firm's dividend payout ratio determines the fraction of earnings that will be taxed
immediately as dividends. The rest of the firm's earnings will enjoy tax deferral as stock appreciation.
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This helps explain the increasingly widespread phenomenon of dividend
reinvestment plans." 8
2. Dividend Reinvestment Plans
In dividend reinvestment plans, firms continue to distribute stable
dividends, but they also grant each shareholder the option to reinvest part or
all of the dividend in newly issued shares." 9 Firms offer the shares at a
discount, usually five percent,' 2 and once the shareholder exercises the
option, the firm performs the reinvestment automatically. The discount, which
represents the firm's savings on the transaction costs of issuing stocks through
an underwriter, partially motivates the reinvestment. 2 '1 But why, given the
extra tax liability, do firms distribute dividends just to reinvest them
automatically? Why do they not simply reduce the payout ratio?'
22
Managers must preserve a stable dividend payout ratio to maintain the
bonding effect of dividends. 23 The purpose of granting the reinvestment
option only after distribution is to limit immediate taxation to earnings already
designated for distribution as dividends, that is, to exclude retained earnings
from immediate taxation. The automatic reinvestment does not frustrate the
ability of dividends to reduce agency costs, because each shareholder can opt
out of the reinvestment plan and obtain a cash dividend based on the original
118. Corporations have been eager to adopt plans that permit shareholders to reinvest dividends into
newly issued equity shares. In 1974, the first full year during which firms issued such plans, dividend
reinvestment plans accounted for 5% of the total dollar value of new equity offerings. By 1982, these plans
accounted for over 16% of new equity offerings. Pamela P. Peterson et al., The Adoption of New-Issue
Dividend Reinvestment Plans and Shareholder Wealth, 22 FIN. REV. 221, 221-22 (1987).
119. There are two types of plans: (I) where the reinvestment purchases already-issued shares; and
(2) where the reinvestment purchases newly issued shares. Some firms reserve the right to switch between
plan types (original issue or open market purchase) so as to preserve the flexibility to raise new capital
when necessary. See Albert J. Fredman & John R. Nichols, Sizing Up New Capital Dividend Reinvestment
Plans, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1982, at 77.
The option granted in any such reinvestment plan is not directed at the firm's retained earnings: it
is given only with respect to dividends that have already been distributed. Nevertheless, this option has a
similar effect-although limited to the part of eamings committed to dividends-to that of the option
mechanism I consider.
120. The value of the discount is subject to taxation. See Peterson et al., supra note 118, at 224 n.7.
121. See generally Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Decentralized Investment Banking: The
Case of Discount Dividend-Reinvestment and Stock-Purchase Plans, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 7, 7-9 (1989)
(questioning efficient market hypothesis on ground that authors made profit on purchases of discount stock).
122. The answer to this enigma evaded Scholes and Wolfson:
It is puzzling that firms are willing to incur such high costs to pay dividends and then issue an
offsetting amount of new equity. Not only is there the familiar tax cost of paying dividends, but
here we also have the administrative cost of running the discount program, the transaction costs
associated with resales of shares in the secondary market, and perhaps most important, the cost
to existing shareholders of offering 5% discounts to new shareholders. Although the answer may
relate to concern over adverse stock-market responses to cutting dividends or floating an equity
issue through an underwriter, these phenomena are not well understood and deserve closer
attention.
Id. at 29.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49.
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stable dividend payout ratio. The shareholder threat to opt out of the plan
provides managers with an incentive to perform in the shareholders*
interests. 24 If management decided instead to retain more earnings, through
direct reduction of the dividend payout ratio, shareholders would be unable to
restore the original payout ratio when faced with inefficient managerial
performance. Consequently, investors would discount the stock price to reflect
the increased potential for agency costs, regardless of the firm's actual
performance.
The proposed dividend option mechanism would have effects similar to
those of a dividend reinvestment plan that covered all of the firm's earnings.
Annual shareholder dividend options would be equivalent to a dividend
reinvestment plan that fully distributed earnings every year.'2' The option
mechanism would also have the same tax consequences as a reinvestment plan
that fully distributed a firm's earnings. Under the current tax system, even if
all shareholders opted for stock dividends, the option would be treated as if the
firm had fully distributed its earnings and shareholders had subsequently
reinvested the earnings back into the firm. Shareholders would be taxed
currently at ordinary income rates to the extent of their pro rata share of the
firm's earnings.
26
The above analysis explains why firms adopt reinvestment plans-namely,
to increase retention of earnings while preserving a stable dividend payout
ratio. A firm's optimal dividend payout ratio, where the costs and benefits of
dividend distribution are equal, is likely to be less than one. Switching to the
option mechanism and its full-distribution requirement would force upon a firm
the suboptimal payout ratio of one and the current taxation of full earnings at
ordinary income rates.
Therefore, a firm is unlikely to switch voluntarily to an option mechanism.
Under the current tax system, the switch would increase taxes for the firm's
shareholders and cause shareholders to demand a higher return, i.e., to discount
the stock price. The decrease in stock price would be substantial because it
would reflect the present value of all future taxes.' In comparison, other
124. The adoption of a dividend reinvestment plan signals that a firm is performing well A firm that
adopts such a plan is more effici-nt because it maintains the bonding effect of diidends. This reasoning
can explain Scholes and Wolfso.a's finding that a group of firms offering discount stock-purchase plans
outperformed a comparable group of firms that did not offer such plans. Scholes & Wolfson. iupra note
121, at 24-27. But see Peterson et al,, supra note 118. at 228-31 (examining reaction of sccunt) prices to
adoption of new-issue dividend reinvestment plans and observing no significant market reaction for
nonutility corporations).
125. The option mechanism I propose would have some subtle supenonties to dividend reinvestment
plans. First, the option mechanism reduces transaction costs by enabling a firm to reinvest earnings without
an initial distribution of dividends. Second, and most important, the adoption of a dividend reinvestment
plan is within the discretion of management-exposing shareholders to agency costs--wheil the option
mechanism would be mandatory. See infra part Ill.
126. See supra part II.A.1.
127. On the concept of discounts due to taxes, see. e.g.. Alan 1. Auerbach. Wealth Ata.xtmtZaton and
the Cost of Capital. 93 Q.J. ECON. 433 (1979) (discussing effects of capital income taxes on behavior of
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firms could offer investors a higher return by adhering to their original payout
ratio. Unless the benefits from full distribution offset the costs of additional
taxes, firms are without an incentive to switch voluntarily to an option
mechanism.
The existence of dividend reinvestment plans exhibits that some firms are
ready to transfer control over the earnings reinvestment decision to the capital
markets, but that, due to a tax distortion, the scope of such a shift is limited
to earnings already designated for distribution. Any endeavor to pave the way
for efficient firms to shift control over their full accumulated earnings to the
capital markets should begin by removing the tax distortion. To remove the tax
distortion it will be necessary to equalize the tax consequences of stock
dividends received upon exercise of an option and stock dividends received
willy-nilly.
B. Removing the Tax Distortion
Several tax reforms could equalize the tax consequences of stock dividends
received upon exercise of an option and stock dividends received willy-nilly.
For the purpose of facilitating a shift of control over dividend policy, each
reform alternative is effective. Each alternative is controversial, however, for
various tax policy reasons.
1. Taxing an Option Based on Its Actual Exercise
The first alternative, which is the simplest and the least drastic, is to delete
the rules that tax stock dividends upon receipt in an election or in a
disproportionate stock distribution.128 In the wake of this reform, only
shareholders opting for cash dividends would be taxed immediately; those
opting for stock dividends would enjoy tax deferral and perhaps capital gain
treatment. Stock dividends received upon exercise of the option would be
treated the same as stock dividends received willy-nilly (and the same as stock
appreciation).29
The Internal Revenue Code's treatment of elective dividends and
disproportionate stock distributions cannot be justified on tax policy grounds.
firms).
128. While this reform clearly entails the excision of § 305(b)(1) and (2). it also entails the removal
of the remaining provisions of § 305(b). This should not raise any eyebrows because the remaining
provisions of § 305(b) are variations on the theme of disproportionate stock distribution.
129. In 1980, lobbyists attempted to tax dividend reinvestment plans based upon a shareholder's actual
exercise of the option; that is, to defer taxation of dividends received but reinvested. Congress introduced
a limited version of this change in 1981. Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, those
shareholders of "qualified utilities" who participated in a reinvestment plan were able to exclude up to $750
from their taxable income. Congress designed this provision to have no effect on dividends reinvested after
1985. See Peterson et al., supra note 118, at 224.
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The realization requirement counsels against the taxation of all stock dividends,
and neither the constructive receipt doctrine nor disproportionality entails the
diverse treatment of stock dividends. If the realization requirement insists upon
the deferral of taxation on mere stock appreciation, then receipt of stock
dividends upon the exercise of an option should not be deemed a realization
event. The realization requirement has three common justifications.)" First
is the uncertainty-of-profits argument: Because stock prices are volatile, a
taxpayer cannot certainly capture profits until she liquidates her
investment.131 Second is the liquidity argument: If a taxpayer's resources
remain tied up in her investment, she has insufficient funds with which to pay
taxes until she liquidates the investment. -32 Third is the valuation argument:
Without a market transaction, the value of a taxpayer's accession to income
must be estimated by an ill-equipped court or auditing authority.'13 Given
these strong justifications for the realization requirement, why is an option for
cash or stock dividends taxed to a shareholder who selects stock dividends?
The conventional answer is that once such an option is granted, the
shareholder receives a claim over a portion of the firm's earnings, which she
can choose to collect in cash. If a shareholder opts for a stock dividend, the
law treats her as if she received cash dividends and reinvested the funds. The
uncertainty of profits, the ability to pay, and the valuation arguments are
inapplicable to this shareholder, and the stock dividend is therefore taxed
immediately.
The logic of the conventional answer, however, proves too much-it
erodes the difference between stock dividends and stock appreciation. In the
ultimate analysis, what makes the dividend option a realization event and stock
appreciation not a realization event is the specified exercise date of the former.
The specificity of exercise date, in itself, however, does not justify the tax
distinction between stock appreciation and stock received from a dividend
option. If a particular stock has been a bad investment, a shareholder will
generally sell the stock and enjoy capital losses. If the stock has been a good
investment, a shareholder is likely to hold on to the stock and pay tax later on
130. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN. FEDERAL INCO.ME TAXATIO,; 298-301 (9th cd.
1993).
131. See Douglas A. Kahn. Accelerated Depreciation-Ta Expenditure or Proper Allowance for
Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1. 48-53 (1979) (arguing that uncertainty of profits makes
taxation grossly unfair).
132. See William D. Andrews. A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax. 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1113, 1143 (1974).
133. Id. at 1141-42. Many have recognized that these arguments do not hold regarding publicly traded
stocks. See, e.g., David J. Shakow. Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation. 134
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1128, 1132-33 (1986): David Slawson. Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation
of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623, 626 (1967): Jeff Strnad. Penodicity and Accretion Taxation:
Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE L. 1817, 1866-67 (1990); Victor Thuronyi. The Taxation of
Corporate Income-A Proposal for Reform. 2 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 109. 126-27 (1983): Mark L Louie, Note.
Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34
STAN. L. REV. 857, 865 (1982).
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the capital gain. To be consistent, the shareholder who retains her stock should
be treated as if she extracted part of the firm's assets and reinvested the
proceeds in the firm. s The sole difference between a dividend option and
the "option" facing a shareholder who has enjoyed stock appreciation is that
the former has a specified exercise date and the latter does not."'3 This
technical difference does not justify the vastly disparate treatment the two
phenomena receive under current law.
Moreover, the doctrine of constructive receipt is not sufficient to justify
taxing stock dividends received under a dividend option. The doctrine is
usually applied in two sets of circumstances: (1) where a taxpayer has the
inalienable right to receive income on a certain date but delays receiving the
income in order to defer taxation; and (2) where a taxpayer who earns income
attempts to assign the income to another person in a lower tax bracket.
Constructive receipt is usually applied to prevent taxpayers from manipulating
the graduated rate structures. 36 These paradigmatic concerns are not present
in the setting of dividend options. Furthermore, the Code frequently does not
impose a tax penalty on taxpayers who choose to receive a nontaxable benefit
rather than a taxable benefit.
37
Providing shareholders with the option to elect either a cash or a stock
dividend will increase the proportional interest in the firm of those
shareholders who elect stock dividends. This undeniable fact should not be the
stuff of which tax distinctions are made.'38 Congress' stated goal in taxing
disproportionate stock distributions was to preserve the taxability of elected
stock dividends.'3 9 The weaknesses of this goal are detailed in the preceding
paragraph. More important, taxing disproportionate stock distributions currently
and as ordinary income is anomalous: The Internal Revenue Code treats other
similar transactions quite differently. The Code is filled with statutory
exceptions that permit taxpayers to transform significantly the nature and
134. Consider two shareholders. Shareholder A purchases shares of stock and enjoys an option to
receive either cash or stock dividends, to be exercised on December 31. Shareholder B purchases shares
without such an option. Shareholder A is taxed even if she opts for a stock dividend; shareholder B is not
taxed. Yet, in effect, Shareholder B enjoys the very same choice on December 31: She can receive the
equivalent of a cash dividend-by selling part of her shares and realizing the profits-or a stock dividend,
by simply retaining the earnings. Her decision not to sell part of her shares is equivalent to Shareholder
A's opting for stock dividends. Since the same economic reality faces each shareholder, a tax distinction
between the shareholders is unwarranted.
135. As far as the arguments supporting the realization requirement for stock appreciation are
concerned, it should be irrelevant that one shareholder receives cash from the firm's earnings while another
receives cash from a third-party purchaser of her shares.
136. See Stone, supra note 11l, at 943-44.
137. Examples include target shareholders who must choose between receiving cash or stock
consideration from an acquirer and shareholders who must choose whether or not to participate in their
corporation's offer to redeem its stock. Id. at 944.
138. See Arthur W. Andrews & Lawrence R. Wilson, Stock Dividend Taxation Under the Tax Reform
Act of 1969: Expansion of an Ominous Past, 13 ARz. L. REv. 751, 751-52. 767-80 (1971) (criticizing
§ 305(b)(2) for introducing unnecessary complexity and uncertainty into Code).
139. Stone, supra note I11, at 915.
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ownership percentage of their investments without suffering immediate,
ordinary income tax liability.'4 0  Like-kind exchanges,"' transfers to
controlled corporations,4 2 and corporate reorganizations'' are among the
most salient examples of tax-free investment transformations.
More illustrative examples include share repurchase plans and new issues
of equity to the public. A share repurchase plan provides each shareholder with
the option to tender her shares to the firm for cash. Those who do not tender
their shares will increase their interest in the firm vis-ii-vis those shareholders
who do tender. Thus, the economic consequence of a share repurchase plan is
very similar to that of a dividend option. Nontendering shareholders in a share
repurchase plan, however, are not taxed. Consider also new public issues of
equity. When a firm floats a new issue of shares to the public, every current
shareholder has the option to buy new shares. Shareholders who elect not to
buy new shares will suffer a decrease in their interest in the firm. Yet, they are
not treated as if they bore a loss for tax purposes. These examples show that
the economic reality for those who choose to receive stock dividends in a
dividend option plan is not very different from the reality faced by other
shareholders who engage in nontaxable business transactions.
Eliminating § 305(b) from the Internal Revenue Code would not have a
traumatic effect on the U.S. system of corporate taxation. The justifications for
§ 305(b) are far from strong. The reform may cause the fisc to lose some
revenue, ' 5 but Congress can easily employ a simple and small hike in the
corporate income tax rate to restore the size of the fisc. Eliminating § 305(b)
would allow a firm to replace its reinvestment plan with an option mechanism
covering the firm's full accumulated earnings. Firms would no longer actually
need to distribute dividends before shareholders exercised their options. Each
shareholder would determine her own individual payout ratio, based on both
the firm's internal profitability and her personal tax bracket. A shareholder
would select a cash dividend only when the sum of a firm's internal
profitability, the value of a stock dividend's tax deferral, and the value of gain
140. Id. at 925.
141. I.R.C. §1031 (1994).
142. Id. § 351.
143. The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code goeming corporate reorganization!, arc legion See.
e.g., id. §§ 354, 361, 368.
144. See Stone, supra note I 1, at 925-28.
145. According to one estimation. U.S. investors are annually paying S8 to SI8 billion in taxes that
they could have avoided if firms had retained earnings. Crockett & Fnend. supra note 50. at 603. Taxing
an option based on its actual exercise would reduce significantly oserall Treasury tax receipts front
dividends. It is hard to predict how much tax revenue would be lost. Many firms might adopt the option
mechanism and commit their full earnings to potential distribution. How much of these earnings will be
retained depends on both the firm's relative internal profitability and shareholders' individual tax brackets.
A study of a closely related issue estimated that the Treasury would lose approximately SI billion during
the first year of the tax-deferred status of reinvested dividends, would break even in the second year. and
would gain about S1.5 to S2.0 billion in the third year. See Fredman & Nichols. supra note 119, at 77
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re-characterization was less than the best alternative rate of return. A tax-
exempt shareholder, who cannot enjoy tax deferral or re-characterization of
gain, would decide how to exercise her option based solely on the firm's
relative internal profitability.
Under the current business practice of stable dividend policies, a firm's
payout ratio reflects the average investor's desires and cannot accommodate the
wishes of all shareholders. If a payout ratio is too high, a shareholder can
either hold on to the stock and pay more taxes than she desires, or she can
exchange her shares for those of a more thrifty company and pay the
transaction costs involved in making purchases and sales in the stock market.
The option .mechanism would ensure that a firm possessed an optimal "tax
clientele": Each year shareholders would select their own individual payout
ratios.'47 The proposed tax change, by itself, would enable firms that
switched to an option mechanism to offer a higher return than firms that paid
stable dividends, other things being equal. Because each shareholder could
tailor her own individual payout, minimizing her taxes if she so desired,
investors would demand a lower return from the firm's equity and the stock
price would rise. From the tax perspective, therefore, it is reasonable to predict
that most firms would switch to an option mechanism after the repeal of
§ 305(b).
4 1
Modifying § 305 of the Code is the least drastic way of removing the tax
distortion. Taxing the option based on its actual exercise, however, still favors
retention of earnings over dividends because shareholders prefer to defer taxes
and to pay taxes at capital gains rates rather than at ordinary income rates.
Other things being equal, this structural tendency towards earnings retention
will rise in proportion to the values of tax deferral and gain re-characterization
to a given shareholder. For example, a tax-exempt shareholder would be
indifferent between equally productive retained earnings and cash dividends;
a high tax-bracket shareholder, on the other hand, would favor retention of
earnings over cash dividends.
The tax preference for earnings retention should not greatly impede the
shift of control over dividend policy to the capital markets. But the tax
146. A small shareholder, who might find it too expensive to make an informed decision, can either
follow the actions of more sophisticated investors or accept the payout ratio recommended by management.
The mere existence of the option does not make her worse off.
147. In other words, every firm can have every investor as its shareholder (i.e., "client"), regardless
of the shareholder's tax bracket.
148. Whether the tax advantage is sufficient to induce all firms to shift control over their dividend
policy to the capital markets is uncertain. The benefit conferred by taxing an option based on its actual
exercise depends on each firm's (former) stable dividend payout. The lower the original payout, the smaller
the tax benefit. Moreover, the shift of control would be costly for inefficient firms, mainly because an
option mechanism would improve capital markets discipline. Therefore, inefficient managers would weigh
the costs of exposure to improved market discipline against the tax benefit. Given that inefficient firms
would have initially low dividend payouts, it is reasonable to assume that the tax benefit would not always
outweigh the "lost" agency costs for the managers.
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preference for earnings retention will influence the level of inefficiency that a
firm can reach before shareholders will opt for cash dividends. That is, while
tax-exempt shareholders will opt for dividends as soon as the firm's internal
profitability falls below that of alternative investments, a high tax-bracket
shareholder will wait longer-until the value of alternative investments exceeds
the firm's internal profitability by the value to her of capital gain
characterization and deferral. 4 9 Therefore, eliminating § 305(b) will not
provide optimal allocative efficiency. Indirectly, however, the reform will
increase the degree to which markets discipline managers. In those firms with
tax-exempt, institutional investors that both hold large blocks of stocks and
engage in close monitoring, the shareholders will detect even a slight
deterioration in efficiency and might follow up on their discovery by
converting a substantial amount of firm earnings into cash dividends.
Consequently, in firms with large institutional investors, management will be
subject to effective supervision despite the tax preference of other shareholders
for earnings retention.
2. Total Integration of Corporate Tax
Another alternative for eliminating the tax distortion is a total integration
of the corporate and personal income taxes. This alternative would equalize the
tax consequences of ordinary stock dividends and optional stock dividends by
abolishing the benefit of tax deferral presently accorded to stock appreciation.
In a completely integrated tax system, shareholders would be taxed in a
manner similar to partners in partnerships; that is, the corporate tax would be
eliminated, and corporate income would be attributed directly to
shareholders. 150 Shareholders would lose the ability to defer taxes, and stock
dividends would be taxed the same as cash dividends. Because shareholders
must pay tax on the firm's full earnings in any case, firms would at least try
to gain the benefit of distribution: reduced agency costs through a shift of
control over dividend policy to the capital markets.
Given the option, each shareholder will decide for herself whether to allow
retention of earnings. Under an integrated tax system, however, personal tax
consequences will not influence the decision. Because an integrated tax system
will attribute a pro rata portion of corporate earnings to each shareholder,
regardless of whether earnings are retained or distributed, a shareholder's tax
liability will not be affected by whether she chooses a cash or a stock
dividend. The sole criterion for deciding whether to allow earnings retention
149. This phenomenon illustrates the resource misallocation argument against tax deferral. See. e.g..
Fellows, supra note I 1, at 727 (demonstrating how desire to avoid realization of gain drives investors to
make inefficient decisions).
150. See, e.g., DAvID F. BRADFORD, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc TAX
REFORM 69 (2d ed. 1984); Fox, supra note 9. at 371.
1995]
The Yale Law Journal
would be the firm's internal profitability relative to other investment
alternatives. The result would be effective capital markets discipline and
efficient firm performance.'
The debate among tax scholars over integration is intense. 52 Partial
integration, a commonly proposed compromise, would not fully remove the tax
distortion. Partial integration would preserve the basic tax structure, but would
allow corporations to deduct a portion of their dividend distributions, as
interest payments, from their taxable income. t53 In a different version,
corporate-level taxes paid on dividends would be partially credited to the
shareholder as a withholding tax. Although such a system would reduce the
taxation of dividends relative to retained earnings, it would still favor the latter
over cash dividends.' In other words, partial integration would increase the
firm's optimal dividend payout, but it would not enable a complete and
unprejudiced shift of control over dividend policy to the capital markets.
3. Taxation Without Realization
A third alternative is negating the preference that the current tax system
gives stock appreciation over cash dividends. 55 The current tax system taxes
capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income and awards stock
appreciation the benefit of tax deferral. The Code could provide for the
taxation of investors' shareholdings on an accrual basis-that is, the Code
could determine that capital gains on stock will be treated as if realized at
some predetermined date in every taxable year. 56 In such a tax system, true
realization of gain would not be a necessary condition for taxation. Without the
realization requirement, cash dividends would be taxed in the same manner as
are retained earnings-the latter would produce stock appreciation and face
151. Total integration would eliminate the corporate-level tax and confer on shareholders a windfall.
This tax benefit would not depend on the firm's dividend policy. Unlike the alternative of eliminating
§ 305(b), in the wake of integration, a firm would achieve no tax benefits by switching to an option
mechanism. Thus, for the same reasons that managers adopt defensive tactics and reincorporate in states
with strong antitakeover legislation, it can be predicted that they will not voluntarily shift control over
dividend policy to the capital markets.
152. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes and the
AL! Proposals, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 715 (1983) (advocating adoption of American Law Institute
proposals for partial integration of corporate and personal taxes rather than dividend relief because latter
produces windfall gains for current shareholders); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992).
153. See, e.g., OFFICE OF T14E SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2 TAX REFORM FOR
FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
136 (1984) (suggesting 50% dividend deduction).
154. See FOX, supra note 9, at 373.
155. For a comprehensive analysis of this alternative, see Fellows, supra note I ll; Shakow. supra note
156. A sale of stock would still be a realization event.
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taxation on a statutorily deemed realization date.'5 7 The above analysis
regarding total integration is, therefore, equally applicable here.'
A tax distortion prevents firms from voluntarily adopting an option
mechanism. Paving the way for efficient firms to adopt an option mechanism
requires some tax reform, at least the moderate tax reform of taxing an option
based on its actual exercise.159 Removing the tax distortion will not be
sufficient to reduce agency costs, however, because inefficient or opportunistic
managers will still be able to refuse to adopt the option mechanism for their
firm. Consequently, I turn in the next Part to consider public policies that
address this concern.
III. DIRECT REGULATION OF DIVIDEND POLICY
Because managers enjoy their discretion over dividend policy, removing
the tax distortion will not suffice to induce inefficient managers to adopt the
option mechanism. Direct regulation of dividend policy may be necessary to
force inefficient managers to relinquish their discretion. Mandating the option
mechanism is justified as a means to prevent the social waste produced by
agency costs.' 60 Mandating the option mechanism will compel inefficient
firms to shift discretion over dividend policy to shareholders and thereby
subject the firm to the control of the capital markets. Consequently, a
157. This tax reform measure would annul tax deferral benefits and would entail a substantial increase
in the effective tax rate on capital gains. A common objection to taxing capital gains is that such a tax
reduces investment liquidity. Note. however, that the "lock-in" problem associated with the traditional
capital gains tax will not exist if the realization requirement is abolished- Without the realization
requirement, tax deferral becomes impossible and the incenti'e to remain in an inefficient investment
vanishes as well. I do not attempt to decide here which of the above alternatives should prevail Rather.
I argue that the tax distinction between stock appreciation and stock dividends receised upon an option to
acquire either cash or stock dividends is unjustified. Once a shareholder opts for stock dividends, she
deserves the same treatment as a shareholder who makes profits through stock appreciation Either both
should enjoy tax deferral (as in the alternative discussed in Part IL.B I) or both should suffer immediate
taxation (as in this alternative).
158. See supra part II.B.2.
159. In the United States, corporate ]a%% is state lau Without a change in the federal tax laws. no state
will adopt a legal rule mandating dividend options. If a state scre to mandate dividend options. it would
be imposing higher taxes on the firms incorporated in the state, and the Federal Treasury would collect the
added tax revenues. Given the competition among states for corporate charters. it is irrational for any
individual state to adopt such a mandatory rule. The maverick state will bear the cost of firms
reincorporating outside the state and the cost of fewer future incorporations The benefits of the rule will
flow into the Federal Treasury and into other states, which will benefit from increased incorporations and
reincorporations in their jurisdiction. Thus, no individual state will adopt such a mandatory rule unless all
other states do the same. Even if all states adopt the rule. however, another distortion might remain. If only
firms with publicly traded stock are required to issue dividend options. they %kill be at a disadvantage
relative to private firms and other investments and assets.
160. The option only shifts control over dividend policy to shareholders, without endangering
management's overall control of the firm. The chief lobbies in favor of antitakeover statutes are corporate
managers and local corporate lawyers who fear losing their jobs and losing their clients respectively. See
Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion. 57 U Ct,. L REV.
457, 461-63 (1988). Because the option mechanism does not create these risks. and because of its positive
influence on shareholders, option legislation is desirable and may have a realistic chance of becoming law
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mandatory option mechanism will reduce social waste by deterring suboptimal
investments ex ante.
A. The Feasibility of Dividend Options
Is it possible to draft a practical law that would require all firms to adopt
an option mechanism? A positive answer to this question depends on the
satisfactory resolution of two issues: (1) preservation of working capital; and
(2) enforcement of constraints that creditors place on dividend distribution.
Professor Fox, who was the first scholar to consider a universal dividend
payout rule'6 ' as a means of improving industrial performance, rejected such
a rule because of its inability to ensure that a firm could preserve necessary
working capital and would abide by dividend constraints imposed by
creditors.'62 This Section shows how these administrative obstacles to a
mandatory option can be circumvented.
1. Defining Earnings and Working Capital
The core practical problems of a mandatory dividend option are identifying
the level of earnings that must be distributed and determining the level of
working capital that must be preserved.' 63 Corporate law regimes have
161. A universal payout rule is "a rule that would assure that large, publicly traded corporations would
generally pay out to shareholders some minimum portion, perhaps all, of their earnings and depreciation
flows." Fox, supra note 9, at 383.
162. See id. at 400. Fox concluded, using information economics analysis, that a universal payout rule
would reduce inferior investments by improving the allocation of funding to projects with high predicted
returns, increasing sensitivity to innovative real investment proposals, and reducing business concentration.
Id at 384. Fox rejected the universal payout rule as impractical, in part because of the difficulty faced by
entities other than management in determining the appropriate level of working capital (a problem that the
next Subsection addresses). Id. at 400-01. Instead, Fox advocated a rule that would
require each large, publicly traded corporation to seek outside financing each year in the form
of long-term debt or equity in an amount ... equal to a given percentage of all additions to
property, plant, and equipment .... Management under the proposed formulation would have
the same freedom to determine its level of dividends as it does now.
Id. at 401.
Fox's proposal can be explained by his focus on the need to facilitate the flow of information through
the capital markets. My focus on the need to restrict agency costs, however, suggests that such a solution
is unacceptable. If, as Fox proposed, a firm must raise outside financing each year but need not distribute
dividends, free cash flow will increase and the problem of agency costs will worsen. Fox suggested that
management would not be motivated to retain more earnings than necessary; if management really had no
incentive to retain an excessive amount of earnings, however, why would Fox want to force firms to seek
outside financing in the first place? Under his proposal, efficient firms would be able to raise outside
financing, but they would incur unnecessary transaction costs. Inefficient firms, in contrast, would find
outside financing so expensive that it transfers wealth from the old shareholders to the new holders of debt
or equity. In either case, Fox's proposal does not solve the agency-cost problem, and it either creates waste
or damages old shareholders.
Note that outside financing plays an important role in reducing agency costs in my analysis as well.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-38. Outside financing should come into play indirectly, however,
only after dividends have been distributed.
163. The assumption is that some corporations need to preserve part of their earnings as working
capital, in order to maintain their current investments and operations. See Ross Er AL., supra note 2, at
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encountered these problems in the past: In the nineteenth and early twentieth
century, several states adopted rules mandating dividend distribution." The
problem of identifying distributable earnings first arose at a time when terms
such as "accumulated earnings" were not defined in the statutes and did not
have an obvious meaning. Given the complexity of the concept of earnings and
the absence of a concrete definition of the term, it was easy for managers to
manipulate their calculation of earnings; consequently, it was hard for states
to enforce the dividend payout laws. Today, however, it should be possible to
define earnings clearly and to calculate them with an algorithm.' Fox
concluded that "[m]odern accounting conventions combined with more careful
statutory drafting would make this kind of problem much less severe
today."' 66
The related problem, determining working capital, is more critical. The
cases interpreting the old mandatory dividend payout laws reveal that any rule
directly compelling a large percentage of profits to be paid out, if enforced
without exceptions, would impose extreme hardship on some corporations. To
mitigate this potential hardship, the laws allowed firms to retain a fraction of
their earnings as working capital, to be used for financing their day-to-day
operations. The dividend laws never succeeded in determining the amount of
working capital that would be both suitable to all firms and sufficient to
compel the appropriate level of distribution. They usually required that a firm
retain a fixed amount of earnings as working capital that, depending on the
firm, was either too high or too low.'67 Fox envisioned that any universal
payout rule would suffer from the same problem, and hence concluded that the
rule was inflexible and impractical. 6 '
I believe that Fox's view is inaccurate. The problem of defining working
capital is truly complex for any rule mandating a large, nondiscretionary
dividend distribution. Allowing management to determine the amount of
working capital necessary to finance ordinary business operations would be
192-93.
164. "New Jersey. North Carolina. and New Mexico each enacted statutes in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century requiring all, or a set percentage of all, profits to be paid out as dividends.- Fox.
supra note 9, at 399.
165. The Internal Revenue Code's treatment of corporate disibutions of property to shareholders
hinges on the concept of "'earnings and profits-: "ITlhe term 'dividend* means any distribution of property
made by a corporation to its shareholders ... out of its earnings and profits . .. I.R.C. § 316(a) (1994)-
The concept of "'earnings and profits" plays a prominent role in seceral areas of the tax law besides
identification of dividends. See, e.g.. id. §§ 304(b)(2). 305(c). 306(cx3. 355(a)(l)(B). 356(aX2).
56(g)(4)(B)(i). 1362(d)(3). 1368(c). 1375(a)(1). While the tax authorities hase had some interpretive
difficulties with the concept, it maintains a central importance in the field of corporate taxation See
BITTKER & EUSTiCE. supra note 115, § 8.03.
166. Fox. supra note 9. at 399. Although managers tend to overstate the firm's earnings in their
reports to the stock market (in order to increase stock prices and their compensation), the option mechanism
would encourage managers to understate their earnings tin order to limit dividends). The conflicting
tendencies will lead managers to report earnings more accurately.
167. Id. at 399-400.
168. Id. at 400-01.
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tantamount to granting management discretion over dividend policy anew. The
least problematic solution, although far from perfect, is to allow shareholders
to make the decision regarding working capital. Shareholder dividend options
do not impose full distribution of earnings without discretion. Each shareholder
has discretion over her own dividend payout. The aggregate decision of
individual shareholders determines the actual dividend payout ratio of the firm.
Dividend options might be a dangerously poor method of determining
working capital, however, if shareholders would, in fact, almost always opt for
full distribution. Such behavior would make the option tantamount to a
mechanical mandatory rule compelling full distribution and no preservation of
working capital. Fortunately, there are good reasons to suppose that
shareholders will not act in this way. Assuming equal tax rates on retained
earnings and cash dividends,' 69 a shareholder's decision on how much
earnings to retain would depend on the firm's internal profitability. This
decision would be influenced only by the expected return on reinvested
earnings compared to the expected return on other investment opportunities.
The expected return on the existing equity investment is already impounded in
the stock price. A shareholder who believes that the expected return on the
169. To analyze the payout ratio that is likely to result under the option mechanism, it is necessary
to assume a certain tax system. Three tax regimes are possible: where the effective tax rate on retained
earnings is equal to, lower than, or higher than the tax rate on cash dividends, It is clear that full
distribution of corporate earnings is unlikely in a tax regime that imposes a lower tax rate on retained
earnings. Full distribution becomes probable only in a tax regime that imposes a much lower tax rate on
dividends. For my present purposes, in order to focus on business elements, I will eliminate tax
considerations by assuming equal effective tax rates.
Taxing cash dividends at a lower rate than retained earnings could effect a shift in control over
dividend policy to the capital markets without requiring amendments to state corporate law. For instance.
Germany taxes retained earnings at 56% and taxes cash dividends at only 36% (including shareholders'
tax); Japan taxes retained earnings at between 31% and 43.4% while it taxes cash dividends at between
25% and 33.3% (including shareholders' tax). ANG, supra note 37, at 17. Under such a tax regime, even
if the capital gains tax rate were zero, all shareholders would prefer dividends to retained earnings. Given
shareholder preferences, firms have a strong incentive to distribute cash dividends. See. e.g.. Michel &
Shaked, supra note 116, at 380 (comparing several Japanese and American industries and concluding that
Japanese industries' payout ratios were higher in all cases where test results were significant).
These foreign tax regimes are designed in part to promote financing through the capital markets. See
Morris Mendelson, Payout Policy and Resource Allocation, 116 U. PA. L. REV 377. 380 n. 18 (1968). In
other words, although management formally maintains its discretion over dividend policy, in practice there
is a high tax cost to exercising this discretion in favor of retention. Shareholders, therefore, constrain
managerial discretion. An efficient management will distiibute as much profit as possible so that
shareholders can enjoy the lower tax on cash dividends. Consequently, shareholders, recognizing the quality
of their firm, will reinvest the proceeds in the firm.
On the other hand, an inefficient management, aware of the risk that cash dividends are unlikely to
be reinvested, will attempt to retain earnings, Any unnecessarily retained earnings will be heavily taxed,
leading to a substantial discount in the stock price. The larger the discrepancy between dividend tax rates
and retained earnings tax rates, the more expensive it will be for management to retain earnings, and the
greater will be the stock price discount. If the sum of this discount and the discount resulting from the
suboptimal investment is significant, the firm will be a potential target for a takeover. Given that tax
inefficiency is much easier to observe than suboptimal investment, search costs for potential acquirers will
be low. The very fact of significant earnings retention in the face of inferior tax treatment would also signal
managerial entrenchment. Moreover, the transparency of tax-inefficient behavior would make it much easier
for insurgents to win a proxy fight. Subject to all these monitoring mechanisms, management should be
adequately deterred from behaving in a self-serving fashion.
Shareholder Dividend Options
existing equity investment is low will sell the stock, because holding it and
opting for a cash dividend will not generate higher returns. If enough
shareholders join her and sell, the stock price will decline, and the stock will
offer a higher return. In other words, those shareholders who hold the stock
and exercise the dividend option (opting for either cash or stock dividends) are
those who believe that the return on the existing equity investment is
satisfactory. The question they face when exercising the option is, therefore,
whether an additional investment will also generate a satisfactory return.
A decision of the shareholders will determine the amount of retained
earnings needed for growth and the amount of earnings needed to preserve the
existing investment (working capital). A divergence of opinion among
shareholders regarding the firm's future growth prospects is very likely. More
optimistic shareholders will allow the firm to retain more earnings. Each
shareholder will receive a stock dividend to the extent of her desire for
retention. Consequently, a shareholder will increase her stake in the firm to the
extent that other shareholders desire the firm to retain less earnings than she
does. 7 ' The aggregate amount of retained earnings will reflect the sum of
all individual retention decisions. An aggregate of zero should not be
considered problematic: It merely reflects the shareholders' view that there are
outside investments that are better than the one proposed by management.
Indeed, the option mechanism is designed to enable shareholders to prevent
suboptimal managerial investment. Nevertheless, divergence of opinion among
shareholders should lead to some earnings retention in every firm.
On the other hand, the option mechanism does need some modification to
assure that the firm retains sufficient earnings to preserve the rate of return on
the existing investment. As long as a dividend distribution of one dollar
produces no more than a one-dollar decline in the firm's value, the option
mechanism assures optimal reinvestment (as a measure of the aggregate true
preferences of shareholders). If, however, a one-dollar distribution produces a
decline in firm value of greater than one dollar, the option mechanism might
not ensure optimal investment. In some rare cases, shareholders might face a
coordination problem that leads to suboptimal retention.
An example may be useful. Suppose a firm earns $20 per share, of which
it distributes $15 to shareholders and reinvests $5 each year. The $5 annual
reinvestment is necessary to maintain the $15 annual dividend. The stock is
expected to earn the same return in perpetuity, and its capitalization rate is
10%. Thus, the stock sells for $150 per share.' If the firm does not reinvest
the $5, however, it will earn only $15 in the subsequent year, $3 of which
must be reinvested to maintain a $12 annual dividend. The stock would then
170. In this respect, the option plan is the same as a new issue of "nghts" or 'warrants " Shareholders
who exercise the right to buy more stock increase their share in the firm relative to those who do not
171. Price = dividend / capitalization rate = S15 /0.1 = $150.
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sell for $120 per share. Failure to reinvest the $5 in any year will cost
shareholders a $25 loss per share ($30 stock depreciation minus $5 in extra
dividend). A responsible management, therefore, would reinvest $5 and
distribute $15 every year. The question is whether individual shareholders
would also make this decision.
Consider the case in which all shareholders have full information and no
divergence of opinion exists among them. Each shareholder fears that the
others will, mistakenly, try to take the full earnings out ($20 instead of $15),
as that seems to offer the highest personal return for the current year. Put
differently, each shareholder recognizes the need to reinvest the $5, but also
fears that the others will not join her in reinvesting and will thereby cause her
damage to the extent of her reinvestment. In this case, shareholders face a
coordination problem.
72
For simplicity, assume that there are only two shareholders, each of whom
owns one share of stock. If both reinvest $5, they preserve the value of the
firm ($150 x 2 = $300) and lose nothing. If neither reinvests, the value of the
firm drops to $240, the stock price drops to $120 per share, and each of them
receives $5 extra in dividend but loses $30 in stock value. Finally, if one
shareholder reinvests the necessary $5 (receiving a proportionate stock
dividend),173 but the other reinvests nothing, two alternatives are possible: (1)
the partial reinvestment mitigates the price drop (the value of the firm is
somewhere between $245 and $295); or (2) the partial reinvestment does not




In the former case, where reinvestment by one shareholder mitigates the
drop in share price, unilateral reinvestment will probably mitigate the loss of
172. Game theory distinguishes between coordination problems and prisoner's dilemmas. A
coordination problem exists whenever two players (decision makers) do not have a conflict of interest, but
the preferred action of each is conditioned on the action of the other. If these two players could
communicate with each other, they would coordinate their behavior and agree to take the action preferred
by both. A prisoner's dilemma, on the other hand, exists whenever two players have conflicting interests,
each has a preference independent of the other's choice, and the final outcome is one that neither of them
prefers. Even if the two players could communicate with each other and coordinate their behavior, as long
as they could not enter into an enforceable agreement, they would still act according to their individual
preference and end up in a situation neither prefers. See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES
AND DECISIONS chs. 5-6 (1957).
173. At the beginning of the year, each stock sells for $150. Before the option is exercised. the value
will rise to $165 to reflect the accumulated dividend. The additional earnings of $5 do not lead to an
increase in stock price, as the market expects the $5 to be reinvested. Thus, the value of the firm is $330,
and the theoretical firm value after distribution of $15 to both shareholders equals $300. Calculating the
value of each share then is somewhat complicated. X (share price) = $300 (firm value) / (I + 5IX + I +
51X). The value of the stock dividend received by each shareholder is 51X ($5 reinvested / the new share
price). Solving the above equation forX yields $145 per share. A reinvesting shareholder therefore receives
a stock dividend of 5/145 of a share.
174. Without mitigation, the value of the firm equals $120 plus $120 plus the $5 reinvested. With
mitigation, the value of the firm equals $120 plus $120 plus the $5 reinvested plus some mitigation factor.
The value of the firm cannot exceed $295 because complete mitigation would produce a firm with a value
of $300 (firm value with the optimal $10 reinvestment) minus $5 (earnings removed by the shareholder
who did not reinvest).
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the reinvesting shareholder. 75  Although the unilaterally reinvesting
shareholder will lose more than the abstaining shareholder, the reinvesting
shareholder will probably lose less by reinvesting than by abstaining, despite
the other shareholder's abstention. Yet the reinvestment of one shareholder also
mitigates the loss of the abstaining shareholder. While the abstaining
shareholder can share part of the return on the reinvestment, she would be able
to eliminate her loss completely by also reinvesting. That is, she is better off
also reinvesting than attempting to free ride on the other shareholder's
reinvestment. Therefore, the rational shareholder should almost always reinvest,
regardless of the other shareholder's action, 176 and optimal retention should
occur.
In the second case, where the reinvestment of one shareholder does not
mitigate the price drop, the value of the firm falls to S245 . "
Notwithstanding her reinvestment, the reinvesting shareholder would suffer a
loss of $25.42.78 Had she not reinvested, she would only have lost $25."7
Therefore, it is not profitable for one shareholder to reinvest unless the other
shareholder reinvests as well. The abstaining shareholder recoups $5 from
avoiding reinvestment and shares part of the $5 reinvestment of the other
shareholder. The loss of the abstaining shareholder is $24.58.", The
reinvesting shareholder loses more than the abstaining shareholder, but both
lose. That is, each shareholder prefers reinvestment only if the other
175. The reinvesting shareholder would have lost S25 if she had not reinvested (S30 drop in share
price minus S5 in extra dividend). As long as her $5 reinvestment keeps the firm's value above S245.83.
the reinvesting shareholder was wise to reinvest. If the firm has a value of S245.83. the 4bstainmg
shareholder will hold one share, the reinvesting shareholder will hold I + 51145 shares, see supra note 173.
and therefore each share of stock will be worth $120.83. The reinvesting shareholder will ha%e stock worth
5125 ($120.83 x (I + 5/145 shares)). Her loss. then. will be $25 ($150 - $125 = S25). If firm value
exceeds $245.83, then her loss will be less than $25.
176. For example, if one shareholder reinvests. the value of the firm drops to $270 (including the S5
reinvestment) instead of falling to $245. The value of each share of stock would be $132.71 (S270 / 0 +
I + 5/145 shares)). The reinvesting shareholder would have stock worth S137.29 ($132.71 x (I + 5/145
shares)) and the abstaining shareholder would have S 137.71 ($132.71 plus avoided reinvestment of 55). The
corresponding losses are $12.71 ($150 - S137.29) and $12.29 (S 150 - $137.71). The payoff matrix for each
shareholder, given her election, is a classic prisoner's dilemma, but with an optimal outcome:
INVESTOR 2
abstain reinvest
abstain -525. -S25 -$12.29. -$12.71
INVESTOR I reinvest -S12.71. -$12.29 $0. SO
177. See supra note 174.
178. The firm's value is S245. The total number of shares outstanding is I + I + 51145. The share
price is therefore $120.42 ($245 / (I + I + 5/145)) the value of the reinvesting shareholder's shares is
$124.58 ($120.42 x (I + 5/145)).
179. That is, $30 in stock depreciation minus $5 in extra dividend.
180. The price per share is $120.42. See supra note 178. The value of the abstaining shareholder's
single share is also $120.42, and the abstaining shareholder's loss is therefore $24.58 (S150 - $120.42 - S5
extra cash dividend).
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shareholder reinvests as well, but if there is a high probability that the other
will abstain, a shareholder will minimize her losses by also abstaining.'
Although shareholders face a coordination problem, because it is clear that
collectively it is best for all shareholders to reinvest, rational and informed
shareholders are very likely to reinvest, even without coordination.' 2
Nevertheless, where partial reinvestment does not mitigate the price drop,
a joint reinvestment might not occur even though it is the preferable alternative
for the shareholder community. If one shareholder fears that the others are
irrational, insufficiently informed, or unable to calculate the correct strategy,
then she might be better off avoiding the reinvestment. Under such conditions,
abstention would minimize her potential loss. Similarly, each shareholder might
"rationally" rationalize "irrationality" on the part of the other shareholders.
Consequently, all shareholders might opt for full distribution, fail to preserve
working capital, and suffer a loss.' 3 In such a case, a statutorily
predetermined working capital requirement would be needed to preserve
investment, and the dividend option would be rendered impractical.
Assuming such rational irrationality exists in the real world, a simple
solution can assure joint reinvestment. To alleviate a shareholder's fear that her
fellows will retain an insufficient amount of earnings, a drop in firm value will
follow, and she will have made a foolish investment, the option mechanism
could allow for conditioned reinvestment.'" Corporate law could permit each
shareholder to reinvest on the condition that a certain minimum aggregate
amount of retention results. Each shareholder would estimate for herself the
minimum amount of earnings retention required to prevent a decline in the
firm's value. If the firm does not achieve the shareholder's estimated
181. The payoff matrix is as follows:
INVEMTR 2
abstain reinvest
abstain -$25, -$25 -$24.58, -$25.42
INE RIIreinvest -$25.42, -$24.58 $0, $0
182. The game has two equilibrium pairs: Either both shareholders abstain or both reinvest. Yet neither
shareholder has a dominant strategy. The decision of one shareholder depends on the decision of the other
shareholder. Each would like to abstain when the other abstains and to reinvest when the other reinvests.
Nonetheless, the equilibrium in which both abstain is jointly inadmissible, since both shareholders prefer
the equilibrium in which both reinvest. In other words, the latter equilibrium jointly dominates the former
equilibrium. The equilibrium in which both shareholders reinvest is therefore the solution to this game in
the strict sense. See LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 172, at 106-09.
183. In other words, the equilibrium in which both shareholders abstain might "psychologically
dominate" the rational equilibrium. See id. at 109-10.
184. This solution is a variation on Professor Bebchuk's solution to the prisoner's dilemma in the
context of a tender offer. See Lucian A. Bebehuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1747-50 (1985) (proposing regulation of hostile tender




minimum, the firm must cancel her reinvestment decision and distribute cash
dividends to her instead. Given an ability to condition reinvestment on a
sufficient aggregate retention, each shareholder will reveal her true retention
preference and avoid investing in a firm with insufficient working capital.' s
Optimal retention should result. 1
6
The risk of suboptimal retention of earnings will only exist in rare cases:
(1) where a firm needs working capital and does not offer growth
opportunities; (2) where partial reinvestment by some shareholders will not
mitigate a drop in stock price; and (3) where shareholders are unable to
coordinate. In all other cases where retention is needed to preserve the value
of the firm, there is no reason to assume that shareholders will act irrationally
and compel destructive dividends. Furthermore, even in the rare case where a
risk of destructive dividends exists, there is no need to set a predetermined
level of working capital. Rather, structuring the option mechanism to allow
conditioned reinvestment should ensure joint reinvestment.
In sum, three factors prevent distribution of destructive dividends and
obviate the need to preserve working capital by legal rule." 7 First, a
divergence of opinion among shareholders will generally lead to an aggregate
reinvestment reflecting average opinion. The more growth opportunities that
the firm offers, the greater the prospect that the minimum amount of earnings
will be retained. Second, the existence of large institutional investors and the
ability of all shareholders to condition their reinvestment will facilitate
coordination. Third, many shareholders will reinvest automatically, as they do
now. Under current dividend reinvestment plans, many shareholders
automatically reinvest after taxes on dividends have been paid. Some
shareholders will also reinvest because they find the transaction costs of
185. A shareholder's fear that excessive retention of earnings would cause a drop in the pnce merely
reflects a difference of opinion with other shareholders as to the firm's future prospect. A shweholdcr % ho
thinks the firm should only reinvest 50% of earnings but who fears that the other shareholder-, will reinvest
100% of earnings could simply sell her shares to a more optimistic investor.
186. The ability to condition reinvestment will relieve rational shareholders' fear that other
shareholders will be irrational. A shareholder is able to take her preferred move with the assurance that if
others do not follow, she can ch.'nge her election. A conditionally reinvesting shareholdcr will not suffer
from the coordination problem.
The analysis thus far has involved irrationality among rational shareholders. Truly irrational
shareholders, however, might abstain despite the availability of conditioned reinvestment. which could lead
to a chain reaction in which all other shareholders abstain by force of failed conditional rcinvestmentis. Yet.
there is no reason to assume that irrationality would always lead to abstention. While sonic irrational
investors might abstain, others might reinvest more than necessary and thereby counter the effect of the
irrational abstainers. Moreover, irrationality would not survive in the long run. given that shareholders, to
some degree, are repeat players. Finally, given the frequent divergence of opinion regarding a firm's need
for working capital, many shareholders' condition for reinvestment will not be met. and the aggregate
resulting reinvestment is likely to reflect average opinion.
187. To the extent that one insists on certainty and demands a working capital requirement, the
requirement clearly should be minimal. French company law requires that a corporation allocate 5% of its
annual profits to working capital; shareholder vote determines the fate of the residuum. See supra note 108
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switching investments too high. 8 Other shareholders will reinvest because
the tax penalty for disinvestment is too high.'89 The shareholders who
automatically reinvest will ensure that some modicum of earnings is always
retained.
2. Creditors' Constraints on Dividends
Dividend options face a potentially more troubling problem than preserving
working capital: determining the relationship between shareholder designations
of earnings for distribution and creditor restrictions upon distribution.
Shareholders and bondholders have sharply conflicting interests in the arena
of dividend policy. A dividend payment to shareholders both compromises the
priority that indentures generally provide to bondholders over the firm's cash
flow, and increases the bondholders' risk of loss from a decrease in the value
of the firm's assets. Bondholders prefer dividend payouts to be as small as
possible; they attempt to achieve this objective through bond covenants. 9 '
Restrictions on dividends are an important element in bond contracts because
state statutory law and common law frequently provide creditors with
insufficient protection.'t" The ability to tailor dividend restrictions carefully
offers a creditor excellent protection from shareholder opportunism and
provides the firm with better terms for its debt.
92
Once the option mechanism gives shareholders the ability to determine
dividend distribution levels, shareholders may not voluntarily honor the firm's
commitment to creditors not to distribute dividends above a stipulated level.
If the law permits shareholders full discretion over the dividend decision, they
188. If a small shareholder recognizes that a firm has become less profitable, she will seek an
alternative investment, a task that entails searching, information-gathering, and information-processing costs.
For some shareholders, these costs would be higher than the additional return that could be gained in an
alternative investment, and thus they would reinvest in their firm. It is important to note that although a
small shareholder can observe the decision of a large shareholder as to whether to reinvest in the firm, she
cannot easily observe the alternative investment that the large shareholder chose. That is. a small
shareholder can observe that a large shareholder opted for dividends, thereby signaling a view of an
insufficient internal profitability, but she cannot easily discover the alternative investment and take the same
action. Nevertheless, even if it is always optimal for a small shareholder to reinvest (unless there is a
material drop in the firm's prospects), she still benefits from the monitoring activities of a large shareholder.
See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. Management acknowledges the possibility that large
shareholders can withdraw a large amount of earnings if faced by inefficient performance. This possibility
deters management from making suboptimal investments, and all shareholders benefit.
189. If capital gains continue to receive preferential treatment from the tax code, few shareholders will
opt for full distribution. Indeed, if the tax system favored dividends, as it does in Germany and Japan, see
ANG, supra note 37, at 17, there would be a risk that too many shareholders would opt for full distribution.
A tax system that favors dividends, however, renders the option mechanism superfluous. If dividends
enjoyed a sufficient tax preference over retained earnings, managers, who would still have full discretion
over dividend policy, would distribute large dividends of their own volition. The large dividends would
provide the capital markets with discretion over the reinvestment decision. See supra note 169.
190. See, e.g., Avner Kalay, Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10 J. FIN.
ECON. 211 (1982).
191. See CLARK, supra note 54, at 610.
192. Smith & Warner, supra note 75, at 134.
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might opt for a large distribution and increase the risk of the firm's debt, thus
transferring wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Shareholders cannot
bond themselves against this action because the identity of shareholders
changes frequently.
To address this problem, the law should continue to deem binding a
managerial commitment to creditors to limit dividend distribution. The law
should permit this commitment to preempt shareholder rights to full
designation of earnings under the option mechanism. Such a legal principle
could, however, open the door to collusion between management and creditors
to restrict dividends more than is necessary to protect the bondholders.''
Such collusion would frustrate the operation of the option mechanism and
breach management's fiduciary duty of loyalty. In order to create a greater
deterrent effect, courts should assign liability to creditors as well as to
management.194
Collusion between managers and creditors can be prevented without
relying exclusively on court scrutiny. One possible solution is to require a
majority of independent directors to approve each bond contract that restricts
distributions. Another possible solution is to require shareholder approval of
restrictive bond contracts.' 95 Dividend restrictions are a common feature of
debt financing, but they are imposed mainly by long-term debtholders.' 6
Long-term debt contracts are infrequent in the business life of most firms.
Consequently, requiring shareholder approval of long-term debt contracts
would not significantly impede management's control over a firm's operation.
Director or shareholder review of the bond contract might include asking for
a competitive bid from another creditor or for an outside opinion on the
necessity and reasonableness of the dividend restriction. If these contracts are
to be subject to shareholder approval, management should present an
alternative contract whenever possible, in order to enable shareholders to
evaluate the restriction's value. Approval by independent directors or
shareholders should be sufficient to ensure that a dividend restriction is
reasonable and the result of an arm's-length transaction.
To summarize, dividend options will not fail to preserve a firm's working
capital. In most cases, shareholders would use their discretion rationally; a firm
can avoid the occasional problem of destructive dividends by allowing for
conditioned reinvestment. The risk of collusion between management and
193. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coaltions. Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game.
78 GEo. L.J. 1495 (1990) (discussing consequences of deal making between managers and bondholders).
194. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of choosing between a rule that would require courts to
scrutinize the dividend policy itself and a rule that would require courts to examine the propriety of
creditors' constraints on dividends. As I demonstrate later, courts are better able to perform the latter task,
See infra part III.B. Put differently. I advocate shifting from a "duty of care" to a "dut) of loyalty- test.
195. For an identical proposal in a similar context. see Edward B. Rock. Controlling the Dark Side
of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987. 1023-24 (1994).
196. See Smith & Warner. supra note 75. at 134-35.
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creditors can also be minimized by requiring shareholder approval of bond
indentures. Firms can design the other elements of the option (e.g., the number
of dates for exercising the option, the procedures for exercising the option, the
statute of limitations) so as to assure efficient operation.
B. The Role of the Courts
A state corporate law mandating dividend options should limit itself to
structural intervention. That is, the law should transfer discretion over dividend
policy from management to shareholders; it should not attempt to determine
firms' dividend policies. A properly circumscribed option mechanism will not
affect any entrepreneur's substantive business judgment. Instead, it will shift
the right to make the substantive business decisions regarding dividend policy
from management to shareholders.'97 The importance of restricting legal
intervention to structural aspects becomes clearer upon even a cursory
examination of the institutional competence of courts.
Under current law, the business judgment rule protects management's
control over dividend policy. Courts have established the rule that directors
possess sole discretion over whether or not to declare dividends. Unless
management abuses its discretion, the courts will not interfere.'98 This rule
removes any effective limits on managers' distribution decisions. One might
argue that courts have simply accepted the dividend irrelevance theorem:
Shareholders should have no right to compel dividends because dividend policy
will not affect the firm's value. The actual reason for judicial nonintervention,
however, is more practical. Determining a firm's dividend policy, or even the
appropriate size of a single distribution, is a complicated matter. At the least,
it requires considerable knowledge of a firm's internal affairs and its overall
economic position. Courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of
management, a body of people with more knowledge about the firm and more
expertise in making business decisions. Because courts are ill suited to
scrutinize a decision as complex as establishing a firm's dividend policy, they
compel distributions in only limited circumstances: fraud, bad faith, and gross
mismanagement. Therefore, a shareholder's suit to compel dividend
distribution, based on the claim that management is investing in bad projects,
has precious little chance of succeeding.
Yet many scholars, including myself, have argued that there is a need for
intervention.'99 The main argument for intervention is the conflict of interest
197. Restricting dividend options to a mere shift of discretion ensures their suitability for all firms.
As the above analysis of working capital shows, see supra part I.A. I, there are good reasons to think that
shareholders would select an appropriate payout ratio. It is unlikely that they would opt for zero dividends
when their firm had a host of new profit opportunities.
198. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 10.
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between shareholders and management over dividend policy. Most proposals
for change fail to acknowledge the limited ability of courts to review the
propriety of business decisions. This failure to recognize the institutional
incompetence of courts dooms these proposals.
One commentator has suggested that courts should not protect
management's dividend decisions with the business judgment rule because the
dividend decision involves an inherent conflict of interest between management
and shareholders.2'0 This line of thinking implies that a properly reformed
jurisprudence and more aggressive courts could solve the agency-cost problems
of corporate governance. This implication is clearly problematic since courts
employ the business judgment rule. precisely because of their institutional
inability to second-guess business decisions. Suppose that the courts partially
abandoned the business judgment rule and placed the burden of proof on
management to defend its dividend policy. How would courts determine
whether a given dividend policy is "correct"? Given judicial inability to
scrutinize business decisions effectively, management might become
excessively prodigal with the firm's retained earnings in order to avoid a
lawsuit.2°1 In any case, courts are probably worse than self-interested
managers at crafting a firm's dividend payout policy.
Other scholars have argued that courts could determine the appropriateness
of a given firm's dividend policy by comparing it to the dividend policies of
similar firms in the same industry. Judges could employ statistical tools to
calculate an average payout ratio for similar firms, which would serve as a
benchmark for reasonableness. This proposal suffers from three salient defects.
First, the proposal cannot eliminate judicial second-guessing of complex
business decisions. Even the scholars advocating this judicial tack admit: "Of
course, management would have the opportunity to present whatever
circumstances it may deem proper to justify its purposes for having a payout
ratio differing significantly from that of the industry norm (mean)."
-° This
proposal only channels the judicial inquiry by slightly restricting the kind of
business considerations that management can offer to justify its dividend
decisions. Courts are no more competent to analyze these focused justifications
than they are to analyze unfocused justifications. Second, even assuming the
economic appropriateness of using an industry mean payout ratio as a guide
(a troubling assumption in itself), courts would find themselves constantly
examining the adequacy of the statistical procedures employed to calculate
industry means. Third, there is every reason to expect that many industries
systematically distribute an inappropriately meager amount of dividends. An
200. See Israel, supra note 8, at 98.
201. Courts still face the problem of evaluating managerial justifications for a givcn di idend policy.
Regardless of who has the burden of proof, evaluating these proferred justifications remains a complex taA.
202. C. Wayne Shepherd & David F. Scott, Jr.. Corporate Dividend Policy: Some Legal and Financial
Aspects, 13 AM. Bus. L. 199, 223 (1975).
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intra-industry dividend payout ratio comparison will not detect these sorts of
industry-wide inefficiencies.
Some state legislatures have taken a different approach: compelling firms
to distribute a predetermined ratio of dividends to earnings each year.2 3 In
theory, this bright-line rule should have obviated the need for judicial scrutiny
of a firm's dividend policy. Unfortunately, this approach to dividends has had
little success. First, state laws left many important terms undefined; courts had
to define complex concepts such as "accrued earnings." Second, these
innovative state legislatures recognized the importance of qualifying their
dividend laws so as to prevent hardship to unusual firms. The duty to decide
whether a firm fell within the scope of a given exception naturally devolved
upon the courts. Courts did not prove equal to the task, and their inability to
assess the ramifications of business complexities eventually led to the failure
of these attempts to control dividend policy by law.
Finally, one commentator has suggested that states adopt a corporate law
rule that compels management to provide relevant information to shareholders
whenever management changes a firm's dividend policy.2" Even assuming
the wisdom of such a rule in the abstract, how are coutrts to determine the
adequacy of the information provided to shareholders in practice? Scrutinizing
informational adequacy under this rule would afflict courts with the same
difficulties that they would have in directly examining a firm's dividend
policy. This rule would simply shift the focus of scrutiny from the action
itself-adopting a dividend policy-to the information underlying the action.
Any proposal advocating judicial intervention in managerial discretion over
divided policy must acknowledge that courts are poorly equipped to second-
guess complex business decisions. A salient advantage of dividend options is
that they would require minimal judicial supervision. Dividend options would
not require courts to determine the appropriateness of any dividend policy;
rather, the capital markets would make this substantive business decision. For
several reasons, the capital markets are best suited to make and supervise this
business decision. First, the capital markets have extensive knowledge about
the firm and the requisite expertise for examining the appropriateness of the
firm's dividend policy. Second, the capital markets have substantial experience
in reviewing firms' investment potential-they perform this role every day
when pricing stocks or supplying new funds to firms. Third, the capital
markets have the proper incentives in establishing a firm's dividend
policy-investors will fully bear the costs of any decision to override
management's judgment.
Shareholder dividend options would relieve the courts of the difficult task
of scrutinizing dividend policy. With most aspects of the option mechanism
203. See supra note 164.
204. See Brudney, supra note 10, at 114.
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defined by law, courts would become purely mechanical enforcement
ministries. Courts would only have to supervise firms' adherence to the terms
of the option: e.g., establishment of option exercise dates, timely and accurate
distribution of cash to shareholders opting for cash dividends, timely and
accurate distribution of stock to shareholders opting for stock dividends, and
compliance with designated accounting methods. Dividend options limit the
courts' role to one of fairly technical supervision. Restricting courts to tasks
that they can feasibly perform is a chief merit of the option mechanism.
IV. CONCLUSION
Efficiency dictates that corporate law shift control over dividend policy
from management to the capital markets. This shift will give the capital
markets control over a substantial portion of firm financing and will thereby
increase the amount of direct capital markets discipline over firms'
performance. Giving the capital markets discretion over the reinvestment
decision will significantly reduce the agency costs of corporate governance.
Shifting control over dividend policy to the capital markets will also assist
firms in achieving more efficiently the goals they now strive to reach through
a stable dividend policy. The best means of effecting the shift is through a
corporate law rule that requires firms to provide their shareholders with the
periodic right to opt for either cash or stock dividends.205
Today even efficient firms will find it too expensive to switch to an option
mechanism because our system of corporate taxation treats shareholder options
to receive cash or stock dividends as taxable cash dividends regardless of
whether a shareholder actually elects to receive cash. Even without the tax
distortion, however, most inefficient firms would refuse to subject themselves
to the scrutiny of the capital markets by shifting control over dividend policy
to shareholders. Both of these impediments-the tax distortion and managerial
reluctance to relinquish control-warrant regulatory intervention.
At the least, Congress should remove the tax distortion that discourages
efficient firms from voluntarily shifting control. The least objectionable method
of removing the distortion would be to tax dividend options based on their
actual exercise. More d-astic measures would involve either total integration
205. It is possible that enabling legislation, in the form of an opt-out provision, might be sufficient
to economize on agency costs. To prevent current and future shareholders from obtaining di. sdend options.
management would need to persuade a majority or suprmajonty of current shareholders to vote to reject
dividend options. The adequacy of such an enabling provision would depend upon the individual ow.'nership
structure of a firm. A-management that holds substantial stock in the firm would find it easier to opt out.
but, as management's holdings increase, the risk of agency costs decreases and the need for the option
mechanism decreases pro tanto. Enabling legislation containing an opt-in provision, on the other hand.
would allow management to take advantage of collective action problems and shareholder apathy, because
management controls the proxy mechanism and meeting agendas, it will have a much easier time a% oidang
an opt-in option mechanism.
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of the corporate tax or elimination of the realization requirement from the law
of federal income taxation. To goad balking, inefficient firms, state legislatures
ought to mandate the option mechanism, and thereby enhance the level of
capital markets scrutiny of earnings reinvestment decisions.
Reform should be gradual, starting with the removal of the tax distortion.
After observing how firms respond to this change in a free-market
environment, state legislatures can decide whether there is a need to facilitate
adoption of the option mechanism by enacting enabling legislation, e.g., an
opt-out provision. The last stage of reform would depend on the success of the
enabling legislation to reduce agency costs. If enabling legislation is
ineffectual, state corporate law ought to mandate the option. Gradual
implementation and observation of market responses would enable decision
makers to better guide each stage of the reform.
Facilitating a shift of control over dividend policy from management to the
capital markets is both desirable and feasible. Legal reform that facilitates such
a shift will increase significantly the ability of the capital markets to discipline
firms directly, thus improving firms' performance and minimizing the need for
the cruder and more costly control measure of the hostile takeover.
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